path: root/executor/executor_linux.h

// Copyright 2015 syzkaller project authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by Apache 2 LICENSE that can be found in the LICENSE file.

#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <unistd.h>

const unsigned long KCOV_TRACE_PC = 0;
const unsigned long KCOV_TRACE_CMP = 1;

template <typename kernel_u64_t, int N>
struct kcov_remote_arg {
	unsigned trace_mode;
	unsigned area_size;
	unsigned num_handles;
	kernel_u64_t common_handle;
	kernel_u64_t handles[N];
};

struct uint64_aligned64 {
	uint64 v;
} __attribute__((aligned(8)));

struct uint64_aligned32 {
	uint64 v;
} __attribute__((packed, aligned(4)));

typedef kcov_remote_arg<uint64_aligned32, 0> kcov_remote_arg32;
typedef kcov_remote_arg<uint64_aligned64, 0> kcov_remote_arg64;

typedef char kcov_remote_arg32_size[sizeof(kcov_remote_arg32) == 20 ? 1 : -1];
typedef char kcov_remote_arg64_size[sizeof(kcov_remote_arg64) == 24 ? 1 : -1];

#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE32 _IOR('c', 1, uint32)
#define KCOV_INIT_TRACE64 _IOR('c', 1, uint64)
#define KCOV_ENABLE _IO('c', 100)
#define KCOV_DISABLE _IO('c', 101)
#define KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE32 _IOW('c', 102, kcov_remote_arg32)
#define KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE64 _IOW('c', 102, kcov_remote_arg64)

#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON (0x00ull << 56)
#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB (0x01ull << 56)

#define KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK (0xffull << 56)
#define KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK (0xffffffffull)

static inline __u64 kcov_remote_handle(__u64 subsys, __u64 inst)
{
	if (subsys & ~KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_MASK || inst & ~KCOV_INSTANCE_MASK)
		return 0;
	return subsys | inst;
}

static bool detect_kernel_bitness();

static void os_init(int argc, char** argv, char* data, size_t data_size)
{
	prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, SIGKILL, 0, 0, 0);
	is_kernel_64_bit = detect_kernel_bitness();
	// Surround the main data mapping with PROT_NONE pages to make virtual address layout more consistent
	// across different configurations (static/non-static build) and C repros.
	// One observed case before: executor had a mapping above the data mapping (output region),
	// while C repros did not have that mapping above, as the result in one case VMA had next link,
	// while in the other it didn't and it caused a bug to not reproduce with the C repro.
	if (mmap(data - SYZ_PAGE_SIZE, SYZ_PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) != data - SYZ_PAGE_SIZE)
		fail("mmap of left data PROT_NONE page failed");
	if (mmap(data, data_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) != data)
		fail("mmap of data segment failed");
	if (mmap(data + data_size, SYZ_PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_ANON | MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0) != data + data_size)
		fail("mmap of right data PROT_NONE page failed");
}

static __thread cover_t* current_cover;

static intptr_t execute_syscall(const call_t* c, intptr_t a[kMaxArgs])
{
	if (c->call)
		return c->call(a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4], a[5], a[6], a[7], a[8]);
	intptr_t res = syscall(c->sys_nr, a[0], a[1], a[2], a[3], a[4], a[5]);
	// Some prctl commands don't respect the normal convention for return values
	// (e.g. PR_GET_TIMERSLACK, but there are more) and may produce all possible
	// errno values. This conflicts with fallback coverage.
	if (!flag_coverage && res == -1 && !strcmp(c->name, "prctl"))
		errno = EINVAL;
	return res;
}

static void cover_open(cover_t* cov, bool extra)
{
	int fd = open("/sys/kernel/debug/kcov", O_RDWR);
	if (fd == -1) {
		const int err = errno;
		if (chdir("/sys/"))
			fprintf(stderr, "/sys/ does not exist.\n");
		else if (chdir("/sys/kernel/"))
			fprintf(stderr, "/sys/kernel/ does not exist.\n");
		else if (chdir("/sys/kernel/debug/"))
			fprintf(stderr, "/sys/kernel/debug/ does not exist.\n");
		fd = open("/proc/mounts", O_RDONLY);
		if (fd == -1) {
			fprintf(stderr, "open of /proc/mounts failed.\n");
			if (chdir("/proc/"))
				fprintf(stderr, "/proc/ does not exist.\n");
		} else {
			static char buffer[4096];
			int len;
			fprintf(stderr, "Content of /proc/mounts\n");
			while ((len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer))) > 0)
				fwrite(buffer, 1, len, stderr);
			close(fd);
		}
		errno = err;
		fail("open of /sys/kernel/debug/kcov failed");
	}
	if (dup2(fd, cov->fd) < 0)
		fail("filed to dup2(%d, %d) cover fd", fd, cov->fd);
	close(fd);
	const int kcov_init_trace = is_kernel_64_bit ? KCOV_INIT_TRACE64 : KCOV_INIT_TRACE32;
	const int cover_size = extra ? kExtraCoverSize : kCoverSize;
	if (ioctl(cov->fd, kcov_init_trace, cover_size))
		fail("cover init trace write failed");
	size_t mmap_alloc_size = cover_size * (is_kernel_64_bit ? 8 : 4);
	cov->data = (char*)mmap(NULL, mmap_alloc_size,
				PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, cov->fd, 0);
	if (cov->data == MAP_FAILED)
		fail("cover mmap failed");
	cov->data_end = cov->data + mmap_alloc_size;
}

static void cover_protect(cover_t* cov)
{
}

static void cover_unprotect(cover_t* cov)
{
}

template <typename kernel_u64_t>
static void enable_remote_cover(cover_t* cov, unsigned long ioctl_cmd, unsigned int kcov_mode)
{
	kcov_remote_arg<kernel_u64_t, 1> arg = {
	    .trace_mode = kcov_mode,
	};
	// Coverage buffer size of background threads.
	arg.area_size = kExtraCoverSize;
	arg.num_handles = 1;
	arg.handles[0].v = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_USB, procid + 1);
	arg.common_handle.v = kcov_remote_handle(KCOV_SUBSYSTEM_COMMON, procid + 1);
	if (ioctl(cov->fd, ioctl_cmd, &arg))
		exitf("remote cover enable write trace failed");
}

static void cover_enable(cover_t* cov, bool collect_comps, bool extra)
{
	unsigned int kcov_mode = collect_comps ? KCOV_TRACE_CMP : KCOV_TRACE_PC;
	// The KCOV_ENABLE call should be fatal,
	// but in practice ioctl fails with assorted errors (9, 14, 25),
	// so we use exitf.
	if (!extra) {
		if (ioctl(cov->fd, KCOV_ENABLE, kcov_mode))
			exitf("cover enable write trace failed, mode=%d", kcov_mode);
		current_cover = cov;
		return;
	}
	if (is_kernel_64_bit)
		enable_remote_cover<uint64_aligned64>(cov, KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE64, kcov_mode);
	else
		enable_remote_cover<uint64_aligned32>(cov, KCOV_REMOTE_ENABLE32, kcov_mode);
}

static void cover_reset(cover_t* cov)
{
	// Callers in common_linux.h don't check this flag.
	if (!flag_coverage)
		return;
	if (cov == 0) {
		if (current_cover == 0)
			fail("cover_reset: current_cover == 0");
		cov = current_cover;
	}
	*(uint64*)cov->data = 0;
}

static void cover_collect(cover_t* cov)
{
	if (is_kernel_64_bit)
		cov->size = *(uint64*)cov->data;
	else
		cov->size = *(uint32*)cov->data;
}

static bool cover_check(uint32 pc)
{
	return true;
}

static bool cover_check(uint64 pc)
{
#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
	// Text/modules range for x86_64.
	return pc >= 0xffffffff80000000ull && pc < 0xffffffffff000000ull;
#else
	return true;
#endif
}

static bool detect_kernel_bitness()
{
	if (sizeof(void*) == 8)
		return true;
	// It turns out to be surprisingly hard to understand if the kernel underneath is 64-bits.
	// A common method is to look at uname.machine. But it is produced in some involved ways,
	// and we will need to know about all strings it returns and in the end it can be overriden
	// during build and lie (and there are known precedents of this).
	// So instead we look at size of addresses in /proc/kallsyms.
	bool wide = true;
	int fd = open("/proc/kallsyms", O_RDONLY);
	if (fd != -1) {
		char buf[16];
		if (read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) == sizeof(buf) &&
		    (buf[8] == ' ' || buf[8] == '\t'))
			wide = false;
		close(fd);
	}
	debug("detected %d-bit kernel\n", wide ? 64 : 32);
	return wide;
}

// One does not simply exit.
// _exit can in fact fail.
// syzkaller did manage to generate a seccomp filter that prohibits exit_group syscall.
// Previously, we get into infinite recursion via segv_handler in such case
// and corrupted output_data, which does matter in our case since it is shared
// with fuzzer process. Loop infinitely instead. Parent will kill us.
// But one does not simply loop either. Compilers are sure that _exit never returns,
// so they remove all code after _exit as dead. Call _exit via volatile indirection.
// And this does not work as well. _exit has own handling of failing exit_group
// in the form of HLT instruction, it will divert control flow from our loop.
// So call the syscall directly.
NORETURN void doexit(int status)
{
	volatile unsigned i;
	syscall(__NR_exit_group, status);
	for (i = 0;; i++) {
	}
}

#define SYZ_HAVE_FEATURES 1
static feature_t features[] = {
    {"leak", setup_leak},
    {"fault", setup_fault},
    {"binfmt_misc", setup_binfmt_misc},
    {"kcsan", setup_kcsan},
    {"usb", setup_usb},
};

static void setup_machine()
{
	// nmi_check_duration() prints "INFO: NMI handler took too long" on slow debug kernels.
	// It happens a lot in qemu, and the messages are frequently corrupted
	// (intermixed with other kernel output as they are printed from NMI)
	// and are not matched against the suppression in pkg/report.
	// This write prevents these messages from being printed.
	// Note: this is not executed in C reproducers.
	if (!write_file("/sys/kernel/debug/x86/nmi_longest_ns", "10000000000"))
		printf("write to /sys/kernel/debug/x86/nmi_longest_ns failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
}