From c7d7f10bdff703e4a3c0414e8a33d4e45c91eb35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2020 11:12:55 +0200
Subject: go.mod: vendor golangci-lint

---
 .../github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go  | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 vendor/github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go

(limited to 'vendor/github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go')

diff --git a/vendor/github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go b/vendor/github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..30c32cc03
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/securego/gosec/v2/rules/subproc.go
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// (c) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package rules
+
+import (
+	"go/ast"
+	"go/types"
+
+	"github.com/securego/gosec/v2"
+)
+
+type subprocess struct {
+	gosec.MetaData
+	gosec.CallList
+}
+
+func (r *subprocess) ID() string {
+	return r.MetaData.ID
+}
+
+// TODO(gm) The only real potential for command injection with a Go project
+// is something like this:
+//
+// syscall.Exec("/bin/sh", []string{"-c", tainted})
+//
+// E.g. Input is correctly escaped but the execution context being used
+// is unsafe. For example:
+//
+// syscall.Exec("echo", "foobar" + tainted)
+func (r *subprocess) Match(n ast.Node, c *gosec.Context) (*gosec.Issue, error) {
+	if node := r.ContainsPkgCallExpr(n, c, false); node != nil {
+		args := node.Args
+		if r.isContext(n, c) {
+			args = args[1:]
+		}
+		for _, arg := range args {
+			if ident, ok := arg.(*ast.Ident); ok {
+				obj := c.Info.ObjectOf(ident)
+				if _, ok := obj.(*types.Var); ok && !gosec.TryResolve(ident, c) {
+					return gosec.NewIssue(c, n, r.ID(), "Subprocess launched with variable", gosec.Medium, gosec.High), nil
+				}
+			} else if !gosec.TryResolve(arg, c) {
+				// the arg is not a constant or a variable but instead a function call or os.Args[i]
+				return gosec.NewIssue(c, n, r.ID(), "Subprocess launched with function call as argument or cmd arguments", gosec.Medium, gosec.High), nil
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+// isContext checks whether or not the node is a CommandContext call or not
+// Thi is requried in order to skip the first argument from the check.
+func (r *subprocess) isContext(n ast.Node, ctx *gosec.Context) bool {
+	selector, indent, err := gosec.GetCallInfo(n, ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	if selector == "exec" && indent == "CommandContext" {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// NewSubproc detects cases where we are forking out to an external process
+func NewSubproc(id string, conf gosec.Config) (gosec.Rule, []ast.Node) {
+	rule := &subprocess{gosec.MetaData{ID: id}, gosec.NewCallList()}
+	rule.Add("os/exec", "Command")
+	rule.Add("os/exec", "CommandContext")
+	rule.Add("syscall", "Exec")
+	rule.Add("syscall", "ForkExec")
+	rule.Add("syscall", "StartProcess")
+	return rule, []ast.Node{(*ast.CallExpr)(nil)}
+}
-- 
cgit mrf-deployment