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* executor/android: updated x86 seccomp policyLiz Prucka2023-07-251-141/+135
| | | | | | | | | | The recent docker upgrade to debian `bookworm` caused x86_64 instances to fail in `pthread_create()` due to the android seccomp filter. On `bookworm`, `pthread_create()` calls `clone3()` and `set_robust_list()` which aren't on the seccomp filter (instead of `clone()`), which is. Added these calls to the seccomp policy.
* executor/android: update seccomp filtersKris Alder2022-06-021-109/+129
| | | | | | | | | | These were last updated for Android Q in or around 2020. These were re-generated using the 'genseccomppy.py' script in the Android build tree. Since the filters have changed during the intervening time, fuzzing with 'sandbox: android' no longer accurately reflected what untrusted apps can access on the device.
* executor: add seccomp support for Androidmspectorgoogle2020-03-111-0/+130
This adds support for the seccomp filters that are part of Android into the sandbox. A process running as untrusted_app in Android has a restricted set of syscalls that it is allow to run. This is accomplished by setting seccomp filters in the zygote process prior to forking into the application process. The seccomp filter list comes directly from the Android source, it cannot be dynamically loaded from an Android phone because libseccomp_policy.so does not exist as a library on the system partition.