vendor: delete

15 files changed, 0 insertions, 3879 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/context.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/context.go
deleted file mode 100644
index dd7886dc6..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/context.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,183 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// context describes the state an HTML parser must be in when it reaches the
-// portion of HTML produced by evaluating a particular template node.
-//
-// The zero value of type Context is the start context for a template that
-// produces an HTML fragment as defined at
-// http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/syntax.html#the-end
-// where the context element is null.
-type context struct {
-	state   state
-	delim   delim
-	element element
-	attr    attr
-	err     *Error
-	// scriptType is the lowercase value of the "type" attribute inside the current "script"
-	// element (see https://dev.w3.org/html5/spec-preview/the-script-element.html#attr-script-type).
-	// This field will be empty if the parser is currently not in a script element,
-	// the type attribute has not already been parsed in the current element, or if the
-	// value of the type attribute cannot be determined at parse time.
-	scriptType string
-	// linkRel is the value of the "rel" attribute inside the current "link"
-	// element (see https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/semantics.html#attr-link-rel).
-	// This value has been normalized to lowercase with exactly one space between tokens
-	// and exactly one space at start and end, so that a lookup of any token foo can
-	// be performed by searching for the substring " foo ".
-	// This field will be empty if the parser is currently not in a link element,
-	// the rel attribute has not already been parsed in the current element, or if the
-	// value of the rel attribute cannot be determined at parse time.
-	linkRel string
-}
-
-// eq returns whether Context c is equal to Context d.
-func (c context) eq(d context) bool {
-	return c.state == d.state &&
-		c.delim == d.delim &&
-		c.element.eq(d.element) &&
-		c.attr.eq(d.attr) &&
-		c.err == d.err &&
-		c.scriptType == d.scriptType &&
-		c.linkRel == d.linkRel
-}
-
-// state describes a high-level HTML parser state.
-//
-// It bounds the top of the element stack, and by extension the HTML insertion
-// mode, but also contains state that does not correspond to anything in the
-// HTML5 parsing algorithm because a single token production in the HTML
-// grammar may contain embedded actions in a template. For instance, the quoted
-// HTML attribute produced by
-//     <div title="Hello {{.World}}">
-// is a single token in HTML's grammar but in a template spans several nodes.
-type state uint8
-
-//go:generate stringer -type state
-
-const (
-	// stateText is parsed character data. An HTML parser is in
-	// this state when its parse position is outside an HTML tag,
-	// directive, comment, and special element body.
-	stateText state = iota
-	// stateSpecialElementBody occurs inside a specal HTML element body.
-	stateSpecialElementBody
-	// stateTag occurs before an HTML attribute or the end of a tag.
-	stateTag
-	// stateAttrName occurs inside an attribute name.
-	// It occurs between the ^'s in ` ^name^ = value`.
-	stateAttrName
-	// stateAfterName occurs after an attr name has ended but before any
-	// equals sign. It occurs between the ^'s in ` name^ ^= value`.
-	stateAfterName
-	// stateBeforeValue occurs after the equals sign but before the value.
-	// It occurs between the ^'s in ` name =^ ^value`.
-	stateBeforeValue
-	// stateHTMLCmt occurs inside an <!-- HTML comment -->.
-	stateHTMLCmt
-	// stateAttr occurs inside an HTML attribute whose content is text.
-	stateAttr
-	// stateError is an infectious error state outside any valid
-	// HTML/CSS/JS construct.
-	stateError
-)
-
-// isComment reports whether a state contains content meant for template
-// authors & maintainers, not for end-users or machines.
-func isComment(s state) bool {
-	switch s {
-	case stateHTMLCmt:
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// isInTag reports whether s occurs solely inside an HTML tag.
-func isInTag(s state) bool {
-	switch s {
-	case stateTag, stateAttrName, stateAfterName, stateBeforeValue, stateAttr:
-		return true
-	}
-	return false
-}
-
-// delim is the delimiter that will end the current HTML attribute.
-type delim uint8
-
-//go:generate stringer -type delim
-
-const (
-	// delimNone occurs outside any attribute.
-	delimNone delim = iota
-	// delimDoubleQuote occurs when a double quote (") closes the attribute.
-	delimDoubleQuote
-	// delimSingleQuote occurs when a single quote (') closes the attribute.
-	delimSingleQuote
-	// delimSpaceOrTagEnd occurs when a space or right angle bracket (>)
-	// closes the attribute.
-	delimSpaceOrTagEnd
-)
-
-type element struct {
-	// name is the lowercase name of the element. If context joining has occurred, name
-	// will be arbitrarily assigned the element name from one of the joined contexts.
-	name string
-	// names contains all possible names the element could assume because of context joining.
-	// For example, after joining the contexts in the "if" and "else" branches of
-	//     {{if .C}}<img{{else}}<audio{{end}} src="/some/path">`,
-	// names will contain "img" and "audio".
-	// names can also contain empty strings, which represent joined contexts with no element name.
-	// names will be empty if no context joining occurred.
-	names []string
-}
-
-// eq reports whether a and b have the same name. All other fields are ignored.
-func (e element) eq(d element) bool {
-	return e.name == d.name
-}
-
-// String returns the string representation of the element.
-func (e element) String() string {
-	return "element" + strings.Title(e.name)
-}
-
-// attr represents the attribute that the parser is in, that is,
-// starting from stateAttrName until stateTag/stateText (exclusive).
-type attr struct {
-	// name is the lowercase name of the attribute. If context joining has occurred, name
-	// will be arbitrarily assigned the attribute name from one of the joined contexts.
-	name string
-	// value is the value of the attribute. If context joining has occurred, value
-	// will be arbitrarily assigned the attribute value from one of the joined contexts.
-	// If there are multiple actions in the attribute value, value will contain the
-	// concatenation of all values seen so far. For example, in
-	//    <a name="foo{{.X}}bar{{.Y}}">
-	// value is "foo" at "{{.X}}" and "foobar" at "{{.Y}}".
-	value string
-	// ambiguousValue indicates whether value contains an ambiguous value due to context-joining.
-	ambiguousValue bool
-	// names contains all possible names the attribute could assume because of context joining.
-	// For example, after joining the contexts in the "if" and "else" branches of
-	//     <a {{if .C}}title{{else}}name{{end}}="foo">
-	// names will contain "title" and "name".
-	// names can also contain empty strings, which represent joined contexts with no attribute name.
-	// names will be empty if no context joining occurred.
-	names []string
-}
-
-// eq reports whether a and b have the same name. All other fields are ignored.
-func (a attr) eq(b attr) bool {
-	return a.name == b.name
-}
-
-// String returns the string representation of the attr.
-func (a attr) String() string {
-	return "attr" + strings.Title(a.name)
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/delim_string.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/delim_string.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 0ef2c2510..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/delim_string.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-// Code generated by "stringer -type Delim"; DO NOT EDIT
-
-package template
-
-import "fmt"
-
-const _Delim_name = "DelimNoneDelimDoubleQuoteDelimSingleQuoteDelimSpaceOrTagEnd"
-
-var _Delim_index = [...]uint8{0, 9, 25, 41, 59}
-
-func (i delim) String() string {
-	if i >= delim(len(_Delim_index)-1) {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("delim(%d)", i)
-	}
-	return _Delim_name[_Delim_index[i]:_Delim_index[i+1]]
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/doc.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/doc.go
deleted file mode 100644
index fab552b25..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/doc.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,291 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-/*
-Package template (safehtml/template) implements data-driven templates for
-generating HTML output safe against code injection. It provides an interface
-similar to that of package html/template, but produces HTML output that is more
-secure. Therefore, it should be used instead of html/template to render HTML.
-
-The documentation here focuses on the security features of the package. For
-information about how to program the templates themselves, see the
-documentation for text/template.
-
-
-Basic usage
-
-This package provides an API almost identical to that of text/template and
-html/template to parse and execute HTML templates safely.
-
-  tmpl := template.Must(template.New("name").Parse(`<div>Hello {{.}}</div>`))
-  err := tmpl.Execute(out, data)
-
-If successful, out will contain code-injection-safe HTML. Otherwise, err's
-string representation will describe the error that occurred.
-
-Elements of data might be modified at run time before being included in out, or
-rejected completely if such a conversion is not possible. Pass values of
-appropriate types from package safehtml to ensure that they are included in the
-template's HTML output in their expected form. More details are provided below
-in "Contextual autosanitization" and "Sanitization contexts".
-
-
-Security improvements
-
-safehtml/template produces HTML more resistant to code injection than
-html/template because it:
-  * Allows values of types only from package safehtml to bypass run-time
-    sanitization. These types represent values that are known---by construction
-    or by run-time sanitization---to be safe for use in various HTML contexts
-    without being processed by certain sanitization functions.
-  * Does not attempt to escape CSS or JavaScript. Instead of attempting to
-    parse and escape these complex languages, safehtml/template allows values
-    of only the appropriate types from package safehtml (e.g. safehtml.Style,
-    safehtml.Script) to be used in these contexts, since they are already
-    guaranteed to be safe.
-  * Emits an error if user data is interpolated in unsafe contexts, such as
-    within disallowed elements or unquoted attribute values.
-  * Only loads templates from trusted sources. This ensures that the contents
-    of the template are always under programmer control. More details are
-    provided below in "Trusted template sources".
-  * Differentiates between URLs that load code and those that do not. URLs in
-    the former category must be supplied to the template as values of type
-    safehtml.TrustedResourceURL, whose type contract promises that the URL
-    identifies a trustworthy resource. URLs in the latter category can be
-    sanitized at run time.
-
-
-Threat model
-
-safehtml/template assumes that programmers are trustworthy. Therefore, data
-fully under programmer control, such as string literals, are considered safe.
-The types from package safehtml are designed around this same assumption, so
-their type contracts are trusted by this package.
-
-safehtml/template considers all other data values untrustworthy and
-conservatively assumes that such values could result in a code-injection
-vulnerability if included verbatim in HTML.
-
-
-Trusted template sources
-
-safehtml/template loads templates only from trusted sources. Therefore, template
-text, file paths, and file patterns passed to Parse* functions and methods must
-be entirely under programmer control.
-
-This constraint is enforced by using unexported string types for the parameters
-of Parse* functions and methods, such as trustedFilePattern for ParseGlob.
-The only values that may be assigned to these types (and thus provided as
-arguments) are untyped string constants such as string literals, which are
-always under programmer control.
-
-
-Contextual autosanitization
-
-Code injection vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting (XSS), occur when
-untrusted data values are embedded in a HTML document. For example,
-
-  import "text/template"
-  ...
-  var t = template.Must(template.New("foo").Parse(`<a href="{{ .X }}">{{ .Y }}</a>`))
-  func renderHTML(x, y string) string {
-    var out bytes.Buffer
-    err := t.Execute(&out, struct{ X, Y string }{x, y})
-    // Error checking elided
-    return out.String()
-  }
-
-If x and y originate from user-provided data, an attacker who controls these
-strings could arrange for them to contain the following values:
-
-  x = "javascript:evil()"
-  y = "</a><script>alert('pwned')</script><a>"
-
-which will cause renderHTML to return the following unsafe HTML:
-
-  <a href="javascript:evil()"></a><script>alert('pwned')</script><a></a>
-
-To prevent such vulnerabilities, untrusted data must be sanitized before being
-included in HTML. A sanitization function takes untrusted data and returns a
-string that will not create a code-injection vulnerability in the destination
-context. The function might return the input unchanged if it deems it safe,
-escape special runes in the input's string representation to prevent them from
-triggering undesired state changes in the HTML parser, or entirely replace the
-input by an innocuous string (also known as "filtering"). If none of these
-conversions are possible, the sanitization function aborts template processing.
-
-safehtml/template contextually autosanitizes untrusted data by adding
-appropriate sanitization functions to template actions to ensure that the
-action output is safe to include in the HTML context in which the action
-appears. For example, in
-
-  import "safehtml/template"
-  ...
-  var t = template.Must(template.New("foo").Parse(`<a href="{{ .X }}">{{ .Y }}</a>`))
-  func renderHTML(x, y string) string {
-    var out bytes.Buffer
-    err := t.Execute(&out, struct{ X, Y string }{x, y})
-    // Error checking elided
-    return out.String()
-  }
-
-the contextual autosanitizer rewrites the template to
-
-  <a href="{{ .X | _sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL | _sanitizeHTML }}">{{ .Y | _sanitizeHTML }}</a>
-
-so that the template produces the following safe, sanitized HTML output (split
-across multiple lines for clarity):
-
-  <a href="about:invalid#zGoSafez">
-  &lt;/a&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(&#39;pwned&#39;)&lt;/script&gt;&lt;a&gt;
-  </a>
-
-Similar template systems such as html/template, Soy, and Angular, refer to this
-functionality as "contextual autoescaping". safehtml/template uses the term
-"autosanitization" instead of "autoescaping" since "sanitization" broadly
-captures the operations of escaping and filtering.
-
-
-Sanitization contexts
-
-The types of sanitization functions inserted into an action depend on the
-action's sanitization context, which is determined by its surrounding text.
-The following table describes these sanitization contexts.
-
-  +--------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
-  | Context            | Examples                         | Safe types                   | Run-time sanitizer    |
-  |--------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
-  | HTMLContent        | Hello {{.}}                      | safehtml.HTML                | safehtml.HTMLEscaped  |
-  |                    | <title>{{.}}</title>             |                              |                       |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | HTMLValOnly        | <iframe srcdoc="{{.}}"></iframe> | safehtml.HTML*               | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | URL                | <q cite="{{.}}">Cite</q>         | safehtml.URL                 | safehtml.URLSanitized |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | URL or             | <a href="{{.}}">Link</a>         | safehtml.URL                 | safehtml.URLSanitized |
-  | TrustedResourceURL |                                  | safehtml.TrustedResourceURL  |                       |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | TrustedResourceURL | <script src="{{.}}"></script>    | safehtml.TrustedResourceURL† | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | Script             | <script>{{.}}</script>           | safehtml.Script*             | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | Style              | <p style="{{.}}">Paragraph</p>   | safehtml.Style*              | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | Stylesheet         | <style>{{.}}</style>             | safehtml.StyleSheet*         | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | Identifier         | <h1 id="{{.}}">Hello</h1>        | safehtml.Identifier*         | N/A                   |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | Enumerated value   | <a target="{{.}}">Link</a>       | Allowed string values        | N/A                   |
-  |                    |                                  | ("_self" or "_blank" for     |                       |
-  |                    |                                  | the given example)           |                       |
-  +--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
-  | None               | <h1 class="{{.}}">Hello</h1>     | N/A (any type allowed)       | N/A (any type         |
-  |                    |                                  |                              |      allowed)         |
-  +--------------------+----------------------------------+------------------------------+-----------------------+
-   *: Values only of this type are allowed in this context. Other values will trigger a run-time error.
-   †: If the action is a prefix of the attribute value, values only of this type are allowed.
-      Otherwise, values of any type are allowed. See "Substitutions in URLs" for more details.
-
-For each context, the function named in "Run-time sanitizer" is called to
-sanitize the output of the action. However, if the action outputs a value of
-any of the types listed in "Safe types", the run-time sanitizer is not called.
-For example, in
-
-  <title>{{ .X }}</title>
-
-if X is a string value, a HTML sanitizer that calls safehtml.HTMLEscaped will be
-added to the action to sanitize X.
-
-  // _sanitizeHTML calls safehtml.HTMLEscaped.
-  <title>{{ .X | _sanitizeHTML }}</title>
-
-However, if X is a safehtml.HTML value, _sanitizeHTML will not change its
-value, since safehtml.HTML values are already safe to use in HTML contexts.
-Therefore, the string contents of X will bypass context-specific
-sanitization (in this case, HTML escaping) and appear unchanged in the
-template's HTML output. Note that in attribute value contexts, HTML escaping
-will always take place, whether or not context-specific sanitization is
-performed. More details can be found at the end of this section.
-
-In certain contexts, the autosanitizer allows values only of that context's
-"Safe types". Any other values will trigger an error and abort template
-processing. For example, the template
-
-  <style>{{ .X }}</style>
-
-triggers a run-time error if X is not a safehtml.StyleSheet. Otherwise, the
-string form of X will appear unchanged in the output. The only exception to
-this behavior is in TrustedResourceURL sanitization contexts, where actions may
-output data of any type if the action occurs after a safe attribute value prefix.
-More details can be found below in "Substitutions in URLs".
-
-
-Unconditional sanitization
-
-In attribute value contexts, action outputs are always HTML-escaped after
-context-specific sanitization to ensure that the attribute values cannot change
-change the structure of the surrounding HTML tag. In URL or TrustedResourceURL
-sanitization contexts, action outputs are additionally URL-normalized to reduce
-the likelihood of downstream URL-parsing bugs. For example, the template
-
-  <a href="{{ .X }}">Link</a>
-  <p id="{{ .Y }}">Text</p>
-
-is rewritten by the autosanitizer into
-
-  // _sanitizeHTML calls safehtml.HTMLEscaped.
-  <a href="{{ .X | _sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL | _normalizeURL | _sanitizeHTML }}">Link</a>
-  <p id="{{ .Y | _sanitizeIdentifier | _sanitizeHTML }}">Text</p>
-
-Even if X is a safehtml.URL or safehtml.TrustedResourceURL value, which
-remains unchanged after _sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL, X will still be
-URL-normalized and HTML-escaped. Likewise, Y will still be HTML-escaped even if
-its string form is left unchanged by _sanitizeIdentifier.
-
-
-Substitutions in URLs
-
-Values of any type may be substituted into attribute values in URL and
-TrustedResourceURL sanitization contexts only if the action is preceded by a
-safe URL prefix. For example, in
-
-  <q cite="http://www.foo.com/{{ .PathComponent }}">foo</q>
-
-Since "http://www.foo.com/" is a safe URL prefix, PathComponent can safely be
-interpolated into this URL sanitization context after URL normalization.
-Similarly, in
-
-  <script src="https://www.bar.com/{{ .PathComponent }}"></script>
-
-Since "https://www.bar.com/" is a safe TrustedResourceURL prefix, PathComponent
-can safely be interpolated into this TrustedResourceURL sanitization context
-after URL escaping. Substitutions after a safe TrustedResourceURL prefix are
-escaped instead of normalized to prevent the injection of any new URL
-components, including additional path components. URL escaping also takes place
-in URL sanitization contexts where the substitutions occur in the query or
-fragment part of the URL, such as in:
-
-  <a href="/foo?q={{ .Query }}&hl={{ .LangCode }}">Link</a>
-
-A URL prefix is considered safe in a URL sanitization context if it does
-not end in an incomplete HTML character reference (e.g. https&#1) or incomplete
-percent-encoding character triplet (e.g. /fo%6), does not contain whitespace or control
-characters, and one of the following is true:
-  * The prefix has a safe scheme (i.e. http, https, mailto, or ftp).
-  * The prefix has the data scheme with base64 encoding and an allowed audio, image,
-    or video MIME type (e.g. data:img/jpeg;base64, data:video/mp4;base64).
-  * The prefix has no scheme at all, and cannot be interpreted as a scheme prefix (e.g. /path).
-
-A URL prefix is considered safe in a TrustedResourceURL sanitization context if it does
-not end in an incomplete HTML character reference (e.g. https&#1) or incomplete
-percent-encoding character triplet (e.g. /fo%6), does not contain white space or control
-characters, and one of the following is true:
-  * The prefix has the https scheme and contains a domain name (e.g. https://www.foo.com).
-  * The prefix is scheme-relative and contains a domain name (e.g. //www.foo.com/).
-  * The prefix is path-absolute and contains a path (e.g. /path).
-  * The prefix is "about:blank".
-*/
-package template
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/error.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/error.go
deleted file mode 100644
index fe7821433..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/error.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,280 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"text/template/parse"
-)
-
-// Error describes a problem encountered during template Escaping.
-type Error struct {
-	// ErrorCode describes the kind of error.
-	ErrorCode ErrorCode
-	// Node is the node that caused the problem, if known.
-	// If not nil, it overrides Name and Line.
-	Node parse.Node
-	// Name is the name of the template in which the error was encountered.
-	Name string
-	// Line is the line number of the error in the template source or 0.
-	Line int
-	// Description is a human-readable description of the problem.
-	Description string
-}
-
-// ErrorCode is a code for a kind of error.
-type ErrorCode int
-
-// We define codes for each error that manifests while escaping templates, but
-// escaped templates may also fail at runtime.
-//
-// Output: "ZgotmplZ"
-// Example:
-//   <img src="{{.X}}">
-//   where {{.X}} evaluates to `javascript:...`
-// Discussion:
-//   "ZgotmplZ" is a special value that indicates that unsafe content reached a
-//   CSS or URL context at runtime. The output of the example will be
-//     <img src="#ZgotmplZ">
-//   If the data comes from a trusted source, use content types to exempt it
-//   from filtering: URL(`javascript:...`).
-const (
-	// OK indicates the lack of an error.
-	OK ErrorCode = iota
-
-	// ErrAmbigContext: "... appears in an ambiguous context within a URL"
-	// Example:
-	//   <a href="
-	//      {{if .C}}
-	//        /path/
-	//      {{else}}
-	//        /search?q=
-	//      {{end}}
-	//      {{.X}}
-	//   ">
-	// Discussion:
-	//   {{.X}} is in an ambiguous URL context since, depending on {{.C}},
-	//  it may be either a URL suffix or a query parameter.
-	//   Moving {{.X}} into the condition removes the ambiguity:
-	//   <a href="{{if .C}}/path/{{.X}}{{else}}/search?q={{.X}}">
-	ErrAmbigContext
-
-	// ErrBadHTML: "expected space, attr name, or end of tag, but got ...",
-	//   "... in unquoted attr", "... in attribute name"
-	// Example:
-	//   <a href = /search?q=foo>
-	//   <href=foo>
-	//   <form na<e=...>
-	//   <option selected<
-	// Discussion:
-	//   This is often due to a typo in an HTML element, but some runes
-	//   are banned in tag names, attribute names, and unquoted attribute
-	//   values because they can tickle parser ambiguities.
-	//   Quoting all attributes is the best policy.
-	ErrBadHTML
-
-	// ErrBranchEnd: "{{if}} branches end in different contexts"
-	// Example:
-	//   {{if .C}}<a href="{{end}}{{.X}}
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Package html/template statically examines each path through an
-	//   {{if}}, {{range}}, or {{with}} to escape any following pipelines.
-	//   The example is ambiguous since {{.X}} might be an HTML text node,
-	//   or a URL prefix in an HTML attribute. The context of {{.X}} is
-	//   used to figure out how to escape it, but that context depends on
-	//   the run-time value of {{.C}} which is not statically known.
-	//
-	//   The problem is usually something like missing quotes or angle
-	//   brackets, or can be avoided by refactoring to put the two contexts
-	//   into different branches of an if, range or with. If the problem
-	//   is in a {{range}} over a collection that should never be empty,
-	//   adding a dummy {{else}} can help.
-	ErrBranchEnd
-
-	// ErrEndContext: "... ends in a non-text context: ..."
-	// Examples:
-	//   <div
-	//   <div title="no close quote>
-	//   <script>f()
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Executed templates should produce a DocumentFragment of HTML.
-	//   Templates that end without closing tags will trigger this error.
-	//   Templates that should not be used in an HTML context or that
-	//   produce incomplete Fragments should not be executed directly.
-	//
-	//   {{define "main"}} <script>{{template "helper"}}</script> {{end}}
-	//   {{define "helper"}} document.write(' <div title=" ') {{end}}
-	//
-	//   "helper" does not produce a valid document fragment, so should
-	//   not be Executed directly.
-	ErrEndContext
-
-	// ErrNoSuchTemplate: "no such template ..."
-	// Examples:
-	//   {{define "main"}}<div {{template "attrs"}}>{{end}}
-	//   {{define "attrs"}}href="{{.URL}}"{{end}}
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Package html/template looks through template calls to compute the
-	//   context.
-	//   Here the {{.URL}} in "attrs" must be treated as a URL when called
-	//   from "main", but you will get this error if "attrs" is not defined
-	//   when "main" is parsed.
-	ErrNoSuchTemplate
-
-	// ErrOutputContext: "cannot compute output context for template ..."
-	// Examples:
-	//   {{define "t"}}{{if .T}}{{template "t" .T}}{{end}}{{.H}}",{{end}}
-	// Discussion:
-	//   A recursive template does not end in the same context in which it
-	//   starts, and a reliable output context cannot be computed.
-	//   Look for typos in the named template.
-	//   If the template should not be called in the named start context,
-	//   look for calls to that template in unexpected contexts.
-	//   Maybe refactor recursive templates to not be recursive.
-	ErrOutputContext
-
-	// ErrPartialCharset: "unfinished JS regexp charset in ..."
-	// Example:
-	//     <script>var pattern = /foo[{{.Chars}}]/</script>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Package html/template does not support interpolation into regular
-	//   expression literal character sets.
-	ErrPartialCharset
-
-	// ErrPartialEscape: "unfinished escape sequence in ..."
-	// Example:
-	//   <script>alert("\{{.X}}")</script>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Package html/template does not support actions following a
-	//   backslash.
-	//   This is usually an error and there are better solutions; for
-	//   example
-	//     <script>alert("{{.X}}")</script>
-	//   should work, and if {{.X}} is a partial escape sequence such as
-	//   "xA0", mark the whole sequence as safe content: JSStr(`\xA0`)
-	ErrPartialEscape
-
-	// ErrRangeLoopReentry: "on range loop re-entry: ..."
-	// Example:
-	//   <script>var x = [{{range .}}'{{.}},{{end}}]</script>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   If an iteration through a range would cause it to end in a
-	//   different context than an earlier pass, there is no single context.
-	//   In the example, there is missing a quote, so it is not clear
-	//   whether {{.}} is meant to be inside a JS string or in a JS value
-	//   context. The second iteration would produce something like
-	//
-	//     <script>var x = ['firstValue,'secondValue]</script>
-	ErrRangeLoopReentry
-
-	// ErrSlashAmbig: '/' could start a division or regexp.
-	// Example:
-	//   <script>
-	//     {{if .C}}var x = 1{{end}}
-	//     /-{{.N}}/i.test(x) ? doThis : doThat();
-	//   </script>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   The example above could produce `var x = 1/-2/i.test(s)...`
-	//   in which the first '/' is a mathematical division operator or it
-	//   could produce `/-2/i.test(s)` in which the first '/' starts a
-	//   regexp literal.
-	//   Look for missing semicolons inside branches, and maybe add
-	//   parentheses to make it clear which interpretation you intend.
-	ErrSlashAmbig
-
-	// ErrPredefinedEscaper: "predefined escaper ... disallowed in template"
-	// Example:
-	//   <div class={{. | html}}>Hello<div>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Package html/template already contextually escapes all pipelines to
-	//   produce HTML output safe against code injection. Manually escaping
-	//   pipeline output using the predefined escapers "html" or "urlquery" is
-	//   unnecessary, and may affect the correctness or safety of the escaped
-	//   pipeline output in Go 1.8 and earlier.
-	//
-	//   In most cases, such as the given example, this error can be resolved by
-	//   simply removing the predefined escaper from the pipeline and letting the
-	//   contextual autoescaper handle the escaping of the pipeline. In other
-	//   instances, where the predefined escaper occurs in the middle of a
-	//   pipeline where subsequent commands expect escaped input, e.g.
-	//     {{.X | html | makeALink}}
-	//   where makeALink does
-	//     return `<a href="`+input+`">link</a>`
-	//   consider refactoring the surrounding template to make use of the
-	//   contextual autoescaper, i.e.
-	//     <a href="{{.X}}">link</a>
-	//
-	//   To ease migration to Go 1.9 and beyond, "html" and "urlquery" will
-	//   continue to be allowed as the last command in a pipeline. However, if the
-	//   pipeline occurs in an unquoted attribute value context, "html" is
-	//   disallowed. Avoid using "html" and "urlquery" entirely in new templates.
-	ErrPredefinedEscaper
-
-	// ErrEscapeAction: "cannot escape action ..."
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Error returned while escaping an action using EscaperForContext.
-	//   Refer to error message for more details.
-	// TODO: remove this error type and replace it with more informative sanitization errors.
-	ErrEscapeAction
-
-	// ErrCSPCompatibility: `"javascript:" URI disallowed for CSP compatibility`,
-	//   "inline event handler ... is disallowed for CSP compatibility
-	// Examples:
-	//   <span onclick="doThings();">A thing.</span>
-	//   <a href="javascript:linkClicked()">foo</a>
-	// Discussion:
-	//   Inline event handlers (onclick="...", onerror="...") and
-	//   <a href="javascript:..."> links can be used to run scripts,
-	//   so an attacker who finds an XSS bug could inject such HTML
-	//   and execute malicious JavaScript. These patterns must be
-	//   refactored into safer alternatives for compatibility with
-	//   Content Security Policy (CSP).
-	//
-	//   For example, the following HTML that contains an inline event handler:
-	//     <script> function doThings() { ... } </script>
-	//     <span onclick="doThings();">A thing.</span>
-	//   can be refactored into:
-	//     <span id="things">A thing.</span>
-	//     <script nonce="${nonce}">
-	//     document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {
-	//       document.getElementById('things')
-	//               .addEventListener('click', function doThings() { ... });
-	//     });
-	//     </script>
-	//
-	//   Likewise, the following HTML containng a javascript: URI:
-	//     <a href="javascript:linkClicked()">foo</a>
-	//   can be refactored into:
-	//     <a id="foo">foo</a>
-	//     <script nonce="${nonce}">
-	//     document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function () {
-	//       document.getElementById('foo')
-	//               .addEventListener('click', linkClicked);
-	//     });
-	//     </script>
-	ErrCSPCompatibility
-	// All JS templates inside script literals have to be balanced; otherwise a concatenation such as
-	// <script>alert(`x{{.data}}`</script> can contain XSS if data contains user-controlled escaped strings (e.g. as JSON).
-	ErrUnbalancedJsTemplate
-)
-
-func (e *Error) Error() string {
-	switch {
-	case e.Node != nil:
-		loc, _ := (*parse.Tree)(nil).ErrorContext(e.Node)
-		return fmt.Sprintf("html/template:%s: %s", loc, e.Description)
-	case e.Line != 0:
-		return fmt.Sprintf("html/template:%s:%d: %s", e.Name, e.Line, e.Description)
-	case e.Name != "":
-		return fmt.Sprintf("html/template:%s: %s", e.Name, e.Description)
-	}
-	return "html/template: " + e.Description
-}
-
-// errorf creates an error given a format string f and args.
-// The template Name still needs to be supplied.
-func errorf(k ErrorCode, node parse.Node, line int, f string, args ...interface{}) *Error {
-	return &Error{k, node, "", line, fmt.Sprintf(f, args...)}
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/escape.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/escape.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a9d53dd5..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/escape.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,884 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"fmt"
-	"html"
-	"reflect"
-	"strings"
-	"text/template"
-	"text/template/parse"
-)
-
-// TODO: remove all unused escaping logic inherited from html/template.
-// TODO: replace "escape" with "sanitize" in file names and contents to maintain consistency with safehtml/template docs.
-
-// escapeTemplate rewrites the named template, which must be
-// associated with t, to guarantee that the output of any of the named
-// templates is properly escaped. If no error is returned, then the named templates have
-// been modified. Otherwise the named templates have been rendered
-// unusable.
-func escapeTemplate(tmpl *Template, node parse.Node, name string) error {
-	c, _ := tmpl.esc.escapeTree(context{}, node, name, 0)
-	var err error
-	if c.err != nil {
-		err, c.err.Name = c.err, name
-	} else if c.state != stateText {
-		err = &Error{ErrEndContext, nil, name, 0, fmt.Sprintf("ends in a non-text context: %+v", c)}
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		// Prevent execution of unsafe templates.
-		if t := tmpl.set[name]; t != nil {
-			t.escapeErr = err
-			t.text.Tree = nil
-			t.Tree = nil
-		}
-		return err
-	}
-	tmpl.esc.commit()
-	if t := tmpl.set[name]; t != nil {
-		t.escapeErr = errEscapeOK
-		t.Tree = t.text.Tree
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// evalArgs formats the list of arguments into a string. It is equivalent to
-// fmt.Sprint(args...), except that it deferences all pointers.
-func evalArgs(args ...interface{}) string {
-	// Optimization for simple common case of a single string argument.
-	if len(args) == 1 {
-		if s, ok := args[0].(string); ok {
-			return s
-		}
-	}
-	for i, arg := range args {
-		args[i] = indirectToStringerOrError(arg)
-	}
-	return fmt.Sprint(args...)
-}
-
-// escaper collects type inferences about templates and changes needed to make
-// templates injection safe.
-type escaper struct {
-	// ns is the nameSpace that this escaper is associated with.
-	ns *nameSpace
-	// output[templateName] is the output context for a templateName that
-	// has been mangled to include its input context.
-	output map[string]context
-	// derived[c.mangle(name)] maps to a template derived from the template
-	// named name templateName for the start context c.
-	derived map[string]*template.Template
-	// called[templateName] is a set of called mangled template names.
-	called map[string]bool
-	// xxxNodeEdits are the accumulated edits to apply during commit.
-	// Such edits are not applied immediately in case a template set
-	// executes a given template in different escaping contexts.
-	actionNodeEdits   map[*parse.ActionNode][]string
-	templateNodeEdits map[*parse.TemplateNode]string
-	textNodeEdits     map[*parse.TextNode][]byte
-}
-
-// makeEscaper creates a blank escaper for the given set.
-func makeEscaper(n *nameSpace) escaper {
-	return escaper{
-		n,
-		map[string]context{},
-		map[string]*template.Template{},
-		map[string]bool{},
-		map[*parse.ActionNode][]string{},
-		map[*parse.TemplateNode]string{},
-		map[*parse.TextNode][]byte{},
-	}
-}
-
-// escape escapes a template node.
-func (e *escaper) escape(c context, n parse.Node) context {
-	switch n := n.(type) {
-	case *parse.ActionNode:
-		return e.escapeAction(c, n)
-	case *parse.IfNode:
-		return e.escapeBranch(c, &n.BranchNode, "if")
-	case *parse.ListNode:
-		return e.escapeList(c, n)
-	case *parse.RangeNode:
-		return e.escapeBranch(c, &n.BranchNode, "range")
-	case *parse.TemplateNode:
-		return e.escapeTemplate(c, n)
-	case *parse.TextNode:
-		return e.escapeText(c, n)
-	case *parse.WithNode:
-		return e.escapeBranch(c, &n.BranchNode, "with")
-	}
-	panic("escaping " + n.String() + " is unimplemented")
-}
-
-// escapeAction escapes an action template node.
-func (e *escaper) escapeAction(c context, n *parse.ActionNode) context {
-	if len(n.Pipe.Decl) != 0 {
-		// A local variable assignment, not an interpolation.
-		return c
-	}
-	c = nudge(c)
-	// Check for disallowed use of predefined escapers in the pipeline.
-	for pos, idNode := range n.Pipe.Cmds {
-		node, ok := idNode.Args[0].(*parse.IdentifierNode)
-		if !ok {
-			// A predefined escaper "esc" will never be found as an identifier in a
-			// Chain or Field node, since:
-			// - "esc.x ..." is invalid, since predefined escapers return strings, and
-			//   strings do not have methods, keys or fields.
-			// - "... .esc" is invalid, since predefined escapers are global functions,
-			//   not methods or fields of any types.
-			// Therefore, it is safe to ignore these two node types.
-			continue
-		}
-		ident := node.Ident
-		if _, ok := predefinedEscapers[ident]; ok {
-			if pos < len(n.Pipe.Cmds)-1 ||
-				c.state == stateAttr && c.delim == delimSpaceOrTagEnd && ident == "html" {
-				return context{
-					state: stateError,
-					err:   errorf(ErrPredefinedEscaper, n, n.Line, "predefined escaper %q disallowed in template", ident),
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	switch c.state {
-	case stateError:
-		return c
-	case stateAttrName, stateTag:
-		c.state = stateAttrName
-	}
-	// TODO: integrate sanitizerForContext into escapeAction.
-	s, err := sanitizerForContext(c)
-	if err != nil {
-		return context{
-			state: stateError,
-			// TODO: return sanitization-specific errors.
-			err: errorf(ErrEscapeAction, n, n.Line, "cannot escape action %v: %s", n, err),
-		}
-	}
-	e.editActionNode(n, s)
-	return c
-}
-
-// ensurePipelineContains ensures that the pipeline ends with the commands with
-// the identifiers in s in order. If the pipeline ends with a predefined escaper
-// (i.e. "html" or "urlquery"), merge it with the identifiers in s.c
-func ensurePipelineContains(p *parse.PipeNode, s []string) {
-	if len(s) == 0 {
-		// Do not rewrite pipeline if we have no escapers to insert.
-		return
-	}
-	// Precondition: p.Cmds contains at most one predefined escaper and the
-	// escaper will be present at p.Cmds[len(p.Cmds)-1]. This precondition is
-	// always true because of the checks in escapeAction.
-	pipelineLen := len(p.Cmds)
-	if pipelineLen > 0 {
-		lastCmd := p.Cmds[pipelineLen-1]
-		if idNode, ok := lastCmd.Args[0].(*parse.IdentifierNode); ok {
-			if esc := idNode.Ident; predefinedEscapers[esc] {
-				// Pipeline ends with a predefined escaper.
-				if len(p.Cmds) == 1 && len(lastCmd.Args) > 1 {
-					// Special case: pipeline is of the form {{ esc arg1 arg2 ... argN }},
-					// where esc is the predefined escaper, and arg1...argN are its arguments.
-					// Convert this into the equivalent form
-					// {{ _eval_args_ arg1 arg2 ... argN | esc }}, so that esc can be easily
-					// merged with the escapers in s.
-					lastCmd.Args[0] = parse.NewIdentifier(evalArgsFuncName).SetTree(nil).SetPos(lastCmd.Args[0].Position())
-					p.Cmds = append(p.Cmds, newIdentCmd(esc, p.Position()))
-					pipelineLen++
-				}
-				// If any of the commands in s that we are about to insert is equivalent
-				// to the predefined escaper, use the predefined escaper instead.
-				dup := false
-				for i, escaper := range s {
-					if escFnsEq(esc, escaper) {
-						s[i] = idNode.Ident
-						dup = true
-					}
-				}
-				if dup {
-					// The predefined escaper will already be inserted along with the
-					// escapers in s, so do not copy it to the rewritten pipeline.
-					pipelineLen--
-				}
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	// Rewrite the pipeline, creating the escapers in s at the end of the pipeline.
-	newCmds := make([]*parse.CommandNode, pipelineLen, pipelineLen+len(s))
-	copy(newCmds, p.Cmds)
-	for _, name := range s {
-		newCmds = append(newCmds, newIdentCmd(name, p.Position()))
-	}
-	p.Cmds = newCmds
-}
-
-// predefinedEscapers contains template predefined escapers that are equivalent
-// to some contextual escapers. Keep in sync with equivEscapers.
-var predefinedEscapers = map[string]bool{
-	"html":     true,
-	"urlquery": true,
-}
-
-// equivEscapers matches contextual escapers to equivalent predefined
-// template escapers.
-var equivEscapers = map[string]string{
-	// The following pairs of HTML escapers provide equivalent security
-	// guarantees, since they all escape '\000', '\'', '"', '&', '<', and '>'.
-	sanitizeHTMLFuncName:   "html",
-	sanitizeRCDATAFuncName: "html",
-	// These two URL escapers produce URLs safe for embedding in a URL query by
-	// percent-encoding all the reserved characters specified in RFC 3986 Section
-	// 2.2
-	queryEscapeURLFuncName: "urlquery",
-	// The normalizer function is not actually equivalent to urlquery; urlquery is
-	// stricter as it escapes reserved characters (e.g. '#'), while the normalizer
-	// function does not. It is therefore only safe to replace the normalizer with
-	// with urlquery (this happens in ensurePipelineContains), but not the other
-	// way around. We keep this entry around to preserve the behavior of templates
-	// written before Go 1.9, which might depend on this substitution taking place.
-	normalizeURLFuncName: "urlquery",
-}
-
-// escFnsEq reports whether the two escaping functions are equivalent.
-func escFnsEq(a, b string) bool {
-	return normalizeEscFn(a) == normalizeEscFn(b)
-}
-
-// normalizeEscFn(a) is equal to normalizeEscFn(b) for any pair of names of
-// escaper functions a and b that are equivalent.
-func normalizeEscFn(e string) string {
-	if norm := equivEscapers[e]; norm != "" {
-		return norm
-	}
-	return e
-}
-
-// newIdentCmd produces a command containing a single identifier node.
-func newIdentCmd(identifier string, pos parse.Pos) *parse.CommandNode {
-	return &parse.CommandNode{
-		NodeType: parse.NodeCommand,
-		Args:     []parse.Node{parse.NewIdentifier(identifier).SetTree(nil).SetPos(pos)}, // TODO: SetTree.
-		Pos:      pos,
-	}
-}
-
-// nudge returns the context that would result from following empty string
-// transitions from the input context.
-// For example, parsing:
-//     `<a href=`
-// will end in context{stateBeforeValue, AttrURL}, but parsing one extra rune:
-//     `<a href=x`
-// will end in context{stateURL, delimSpaceOrTagEnd, ...}.
-// There are two transitions that happen when the 'x' is seen:
-// (1) Transition from a before-value state to a start-of-value state without
-//     consuming any character.
-// (2) Consume 'x' and transition past the first value character.
-// In this case, nudging produces the context after (1) happens.
-func nudge(c context) context {
-	switch c.state {
-	case stateTag:
-		// In `<foo {{.}}`, the action should emit an attribute.
-		c.state = stateAttrName
-	case stateBeforeValue:
-		// In `<foo bar={{.}}`, the action is an undelimited value.
-		c.state, c.delim = stateAttr, delimSpaceOrTagEnd
-	case stateAfterName:
-		// In `<foo bar {{.}}`, the action is an attribute name.
-		c.state = stateAttrName
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
-// join joins the two contexts of a branch template node. The result is an
-// error context if either of the input contexts are error contexts, or if the
-// input contexts differ.
-func join(a, b context, node parse.Node, nodeName string) context {
-	if a.state == stateError {
-		return a
-	}
-	if b.state == stateError {
-		return b
-	}
-
-	// Accumulate the result of context-joining elements and attributes in a, since the
-	// contents of a are always returned.
-	a.element.names = joinNames(a.element.name, b.element.name, a.element.names, b.element.names)
-	a.attr.names = joinNames(a.attr.name, b.attr.name, a.attr.names, b.attr.names)
-	if a.attr.value != b.attr.value {
-		a.attr.ambiguousValue = true
-	}
-
-	if a.eq(b) {
-		return a
-	}
-
-	c := a
-	c.element.name = b.element.name
-	if c.eq(b) {
-		// The contexts differ only by their element names. The element names from the conditional
-		// branches that are accumulated in c.element.names will be checked during action sanitization
-		// to ensure that they do not lead to different sanitization contexts.
-		return c
-	}
-
-	c = a
-	c.attr.name = b.attr.name
-	if c.eq(b) {
-		// The contexts differ only by their attribute name. The attribute names from the conditional
-		// branches that are accumulated in c.attr.names will be checked during action sanitization
-		// to ensure that they do not lead to different sanitization contexts.
-		return c
-	}
-
-	// Allow a nudged context to join with an unnudged one.
-	// This means that
-	//   <p title={{if .C}}{{.}}{{end}}
-	// ends in an unquoted value state even though the else branch
-	// ends in stateBeforeValue.
-	if c, d := nudge(a), nudge(b); !(c.eq(a) && d.eq(b)) {
-		if e := join(c, d, node, nodeName); e.state != stateError {
-			return e
-		}
-	}
-
-	return context{
-		state: stateError,
-		err:   errorf(ErrBranchEnd, node, 0, "{{%s}} branches end in different contexts: %v, %v", nodeName, a, b),
-	}
-}
-
-// joinNames returns the slice of all possible names that an element or attr could
-// assume after context joining the element or attr containing aName and aNames with the
-// element or attr containing bName and bNames.
-func joinNames(aName, bName string, aNames, bNames []string) []string {
-	var ret []string
-	if aName != bName {
-		ret = append(ret, aName, bName)
-	}
-	aNamesSet := make(map[string]bool)
-	for _, name := range aNames {
-		aNamesSet[name] = true
-	}
-	for _, name := range bNames {
-		if !aNamesSet[name] {
-			ret = append(ret, name)
-		}
-	}
-	return ret
-}
-
-// escapeBranch escapes a branch template node: "if", "range" and "with".
-func (e *escaper) escapeBranch(c context, n *parse.BranchNode, nodeName string) context {
-	c0 := e.escapeList(c, n.List)
-	if nodeName == "range" && c0.state != stateError {
-		// The "true" branch of a "range" node can execute multiple times.
-		// We check that executing n.List once results in the same context
-		// as executing n.List twice.
-		c1, _ := e.escapeListConditionally(c0, n.List, nil)
-		c0 = join(c0, c1, n, nodeName)
-		if c0.state == stateError {
-			// Make clear that this is a problem on loop re-entry
-			// since developers tend to overlook that branch when
-			// debugging templates.
-			c0.err.Line = n.Line
-			c0.err.Description = "on range loop re-entry: " + c0.err.Description
-			return c0
-		}
-	}
-	c1 := e.escapeList(c, n.ElseList)
-	return join(c0, c1, n, nodeName)
-}
-
-// escapeList escapes a list template node.
-func (e *escaper) escapeList(c context, n *parse.ListNode) context {
-	if n == nil {
-		return c
-	}
-	for _, m := range n.Nodes {
-		c = e.escape(c, m)
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
-// escapeListConditionally escapes a list node but only preserves edits and
-// inferences in e if the inferences and output context satisfy filter.
-// It returns the best guess at an output context, and the result of the filter
-// which is the same as whether e was updated.
-func (e *escaper) escapeListConditionally(c context, n *parse.ListNode, filter func(*escaper, context) bool) (context, bool) {
-	e1 := makeEscaper(e.ns)
-	// Make type inferences available to f.
-	for k, v := range e.output {
-		e1.output[k] = v
-	}
-	c = e1.escapeList(c, n)
-	ok := filter != nil && filter(&e1, c)
-	if ok {
-		// Copy inferences and edits from e1 back into e.
-		for k, v := range e1.output {
-			e.output[k] = v
-		}
-		for k, v := range e1.derived {
-			e.derived[k] = v
-		}
-		for k, v := range e1.called {
-			e.called[k] = v
-		}
-		for k, v := range e1.actionNodeEdits {
-			e.editActionNode(k, v)
-		}
-		for k, v := range e1.templateNodeEdits {
-			e.editTemplateNode(k, v)
-		}
-		for k, v := range e1.textNodeEdits {
-			e.editTextNode(k, v)
-		}
-	}
-	return c, ok
-}
-
-// escapeTemplate escapes a {{template}} call node.
-func (e *escaper) escapeTemplate(c context, n *parse.TemplateNode) context {
-	c, name := e.escapeTree(c, n, n.Name, n.Line)
-	if name != n.Name {
-		e.editTemplateNode(n, name)
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
-// mangle produces an identifier that includes a suffix that distinguishes it
-// from template names mangled with different contexts.
-func mangle(c context, templateName string) string {
-	// The mangled name for the default context is the input templateName.
-	if c.state == stateText {
-		return templateName
-	}
-	s := templateName + "$htmltemplate_" + c.state.String()
-	if c.delim != 0 {
-		s += "_" + c.delim.String()
-	}
-	if c.attr.name != "" {
-		s += "_" + c.attr.String()
-	}
-	if c.element.name != "" {
-		s += "_" + c.element.String()
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-// escapeTree escapes the named template starting in the given context as
-// necessary and returns its output context.
-func (e *escaper) escapeTree(c context, node parse.Node, name string, line int) (context, string) {
-	// Mangle the template name with the input context to produce a reliable
-	// identifier.
-	dname := mangle(c, name)
-	e.called[dname] = true
-	if out, ok := e.output[dname]; ok {
-		// Already escaped.
-		return out, dname
-	}
-	t := e.template(name)
-	if t == nil {
-		// Two cases: The template exists but is empty, or has never been mentioned at
-		// all. Distinguish the cases in the error messages.
-		if e.ns.set[name] != nil {
-			return context{
-				state: stateError,
-				err:   errorf(ErrNoSuchTemplate, node, line, "%q is an incomplete or empty template", name),
-			}, dname
-		}
-		return context{
-			state: stateError,
-			err:   errorf(ErrNoSuchTemplate, node, line, "no such template %q", name),
-		}, dname
-	}
-	if dname != name {
-		// Use any template derived during an earlier call to escapeTemplate
-		// with different top level templates, or clone if necessary.
-		dt := e.template(dname)
-		if dt == nil {
-			dt = template.New(dname)
-			dt.Tree = t.Tree.Copy()
-			dt.Tree.Name = dname
-			e.derived[dname] = dt
-		}
-		t = dt
-	}
-	return e.computeOutCtx(c, t), dname
-}
-
-// computeOutCtx takes a template and its start context and computes the output
-// context while storing any inferences in e.
-func (e *escaper) computeOutCtx(c context, t *template.Template) context {
-	// Propagate context over the body.
-	c1, ok := e.escapeTemplateBody(c, t)
-	if !ok {
-		// Look for a fixed point by assuming c1 as the output context.
-		if c2, ok2 := e.escapeTemplateBody(c1, t); ok2 {
-			c1, ok = c2, true
-		}
-		// Use c1 as the error context if neither assumption worked.
-	}
-	if !ok && c1.state != stateError {
-		return context{
-			state: stateError,
-			err:   errorf(ErrOutputContext, t.Tree.Root, 0, "cannot compute output context for template %s", t.Name()),
-		}
-	}
-	return c1
-}
-
-// escapeTemplateBody escapes the given template assuming the given output
-// context, and returns the best guess at the output context and whether the
-// assumption was correct.
-func (e *escaper) escapeTemplateBody(c context, t *template.Template) (context, bool) {
-	filter := func(e1 *escaper, c1 context) bool {
-		if c1.state == stateError {
-			// Do not update the input escaper, e.
-			return false
-		}
-		if !e1.called[t.Name()] {
-			// If t is not recursively called, then c1 is an
-			// accurate output context.
-			return true
-		}
-		// c1 is accurate if it matches our assumed output context.
-		return c.eq(c1)
-	}
-	// We need to assume an output context so that recursive template calls
-	// take the fast path out of escapeTree instead of infinitely recursing.
-	// Naively assuming that the input context is the same as the output
-	// works >90% of the time.
-	e.output[t.Name()] = c
-	return e.escapeListConditionally(c, t.Tree.Root, filter)
-}
-
-// delimEnds maps each delim to a string of characters that terminate it.
-var delimEnds = [...]string{
-	delimDoubleQuote: `"`,
-	delimSingleQuote: "'",
-	// Determined empirically by running the below in various browsers.
-	// var div = document.createElement("DIV");
-	// for (var i = 0; i < 0x10000; ++i) {
-	//   div.innerHTML = "<span title=x" + String.fromCharCode(i) + "-bar>";
-	//   if (div.getElementsByTagName("SPAN")[0].title.indexOf("bar") < 0)
-	//     document.write("<p>U+" + i.toString(16));
-	// }
-	delimSpaceOrTagEnd: " \t\n\f\r>",
-}
-
-var doctypeBytes = []byte("<!DOCTYPE")
-
-// escapeText escapes a text template node.
-func (e *escaper) escapeText(c context, n *parse.TextNode) context {
-	s, written, i, b := n.Text, 0, 0, new(bytes.Buffer)
-	if e.ns.cspCompatible && bytes.Contains(s, []byte("javascript:")) {
-		// This substring search is not perfect, but it is unlikely that this substring will
-		// exist in template text for any other reason than to specify a javascript URI.
-		return context{
-			state: stateError,
-			err:   errorf(ErrCSPCompatibility, n, 0, `"javascript:" URI disallowed for CSP compatibility`),
-		}
-	}
-	for i != len(s) {
-		if e.ns.cspCompatible && strings.HasPrefix(c.attr.name, "on") {
-			return context{
-				state: stateError,
-				err:   errorf(ErrCSPCompatibility, n, 0, "inline event handler %q is disallowed for CSP compatibility", c.attr.name),
-			}
-		}
-		c1, nread := contextAfterText(c, s[i:])
-		i1 := i + nread
-		sc, err := sanitizationContextForElementContent(c.element.name)
-		if c.state == stateText || err == nil && sc == sanitizationContextRCDATA {
-			end := i1
-			if c1.state != c.state {
-				for j := end - 1; j >= i; j-- {
-					if s[j] == '<' {
-						end = j
-						break
-					}
-				}
-			}
-			for j := i; j < end; j++ {
-				if s[j] == '<' && !bytes.HasPrefix(bytes.ToUpper(s[j:]), doctypeBytes) {
-					b.Write(s[written:j])
-					b.WriteString("&lt;")
-					written = j + 1
-				}
-			}
-		} else if isComment(c.state) && c.delim == delimNone {
-			written = i1
-		}
-		if c.state == stateSpecialElementBody && c.element.name == "script" {
-			if err := isJsTemplateBalanced(bytes.NewBuffer(s)); err != nil {
-				return context{
-					state: stateError,
-					err:   errorf(ErrUnbalancedJsTemplate, n, 0, "Mixing template systems can cause security vulnerabilites. Therefore, there can be no safehtml/template insertion points or actions inside an ES6 template, and all ES6 templates must be closed: %v", err.Error()),
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-		if c.state != c1.state && isComment(c1.state) && c1.delim == delimNone {
-			// Preserve the portion between written and the comment start.
-			cs := i1 - 2
-			if c1.state == stateHTMLCmt {
-				// "<!--" instead of "/*" or "//"
-				cs -= 2
-			}
-			b.Write(s[written:cs])
-			written = i1
-		}
-		if i == i1 && c.state == c1.state {
-			panic(fmt.Sprintf("infinite loop from %v to %v on %q..%q", c, c1, s[:i], s[i:]))
-		}
-		c, i = c1, i1
-	}
-
-	if written != 0 && c.state != stateError {
-		if !isComment(c.state) || c.delim != delimNone {
-			b.Write(n.Text[written:])
-		}
-		e.editTextNode(n, b.Bytes())
-	}
-	return c
-}
-
-// contextAfterText starts in context c, consumes some tokens from the front of
-// s, then returns the context after those tokens and the unprocessed suffix.
-func contextAfterText(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	if c.delim == delimNone {
-		c1, i := tSpecialTagEnd(c, s)
-		if i == 0 {
-			// A special end tag (`</script>`) has been seen and
-			// all content preceding it has been consumed.
-			return c1, 0
-		}
-		// Consider all content up to any end tag.
-		return transitionFunc[c.state](c, s[:i])
-	}
-
-	// We are at the beginning of an attribute value.
-
-	i := bytes.IndexAny(s, delimEnds[c.delim])
-	if i == -1 {
-		i = len(s)
-	}
-	if c.delim == delimSpaceOrTagEnd {
-		// http://www.w3.org/TR/html5/syntax.html#attribute-value-(unquoted)-state
-		// lists the runes below as error characters.
-		// Error out because HTML parsers may differ on whether
-		// "<a id= onclick=f("     ends inside id's or onclick's value,
-		// "<a class=`foo "        ends inside a value,
-		// "<a style=font:'Arial'" needs open-quote fixup.
-		// IE treats '`' as a quotation character.
-		if j := bytes.IndexAny(s[:i], "\"'<=`"); j >= 0 {
-			return context{
-				state: stateError,
-				err:   errorf(ErrBadHTML, nil, 0, "%q in unquoted attr: %q", s[j:j+1], s[:i]),
-			}, len(s)
-		}
-	}
-	if i == len(s) {
-		c.attr.value += string(s)
-		// Remain inside the attribute.
-		// Decode the value so non-HTML rules can easily handle
-		//     <button onclick="alert(&quot;Hi!&quot;)">
-		// without having to entity decode token boundaries.
-		for u := []byte(html.UnescapeString(string(s))); len(u) != 0; {
-			c1, i1 := transitionFunc[c.state](c, u)
-			c, u = c1, u[i1:]
-		}
-		return c, len(s)
-	}
-
-	// On exiting an attribute, we discard all state information
-	// except the state, element, scriptType, and linkRel.
-	ret := context{
-		state:      stateTag,
-		element:    c.element,
-		scriptType: c.scriptType,
-		linkRel:    c.linkRel,
-	}
-	// Save the script element's type attribute value if we are parsing it for the first time.
-	if c.state == stateAttr && c.element.name == "script" && c.attr.name == "type" {
-		ret.scriptType = strings.ToLower(string(s[:i]))
-	}
-	// Save the link element's rel attribute value if we are parsing it for the first time.
-	if c.state == stateAttr && c.element.name == "link" && c.attr.name == "rel" {
-		ret.linkRel = " " + strings.Join(strings.Fields(strings.TrimSpace(strings.ToLower(string(s[:i])))), " ") + " "
-	}
-	if c.delim != delimSpaceOrTagEnd {
-		// Consume any quote.
-		i++
-	}
-	return ret, i
-}
-
-// editActionNode records a change to an action pipeline for later commit.
-func (e *escaper) editActionNode(n *parse.ActionNode, cmds []string) {
-	if _, ok := e.actionNodeEdits[n]; ok {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("node %s shared between templates", n))
-	}
-	e.actionNodeEdits[n] = cmds
-}
-
-// editTemplateNode records a change to a {{template}} callee for later commit.
-func (e *escaper) editTemplateNode(n *parse.TemplateNode, callee string) {
-	if _, ok := e.templateNodeEdits[n]; ok {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("node %s shared between templates", n))
-	}
-	e.templateNodeEdits[n] = callee
-}
-
-// editTextNode records a change to a text node for later commit.
-func (e *escaper) editTextNode(n *parse.TextNode, text []byte) {
-	if _, ok := e.textNodeEdits[n]; ok {
-		panic(fmt.Sprintf("node %s shared between templates", n))
-	}
-	e.textNodeEdits[n] = text
-}
-
-// commit applies changes to actions and template calls needed to contextually
-// autoescape content and adds any derived templates to the set.
-func (e *escaper) commit() {
-	for name := range e.output {
-		e.template(name).Funcs(funcs)
-	}
-	// Any template from the name space associated with this escaper can be used
-	// to add derived templates to the underlying text/template name space.
-	tmpl := e.arbitraryTemplate()
-	for _, t := range e.derived {
-		if _, err := tmpl.text.AddParseTree(t.Name(), t.Tree); err != nil {
-			panic("error adding derived template")
-		}
-	}
-	for n, s := range e.actionNodeEdits {
-		ensurePipelineContains(n.Pipe, s)
-	}
-	for n, name := range e.templateNodeEdits {
-		n.Name = name
-	}
-	for n, s := range e.textNodeEdits {
-		n.Text = s
-	}
-	// Reset state that is specific to this commit so that the same changes are
-	// not re-applied to the template on subsequent calls to commit.
-	e.called = make(map[string]bool)
-	e.actionNodeEdits = make(map[*parse.ActionNode][]string)
-	e.templateNodeEdits = make(map[*parse.TemplateNode]string)
-	e.textNodeEdits = make(map[*parse.TextNode][]byte)
-}
-
-// template returns the named template given a mangled template name.
-func (e *escaper) template(name string) *template.Template {
-	// Any template from the name space associated with this escaper can be used
-	// to look up templates in the underlying text/template name space.
-	t := e.arbitraryTemplate().text.Lookup(name)
-	if t == nil {
-		t = e.derived[name]
-	}
-	return t
-}
-
-// arbitraryTemplate returns an arbitrary template from the name space
-// associated with e and panics if no templates are found.
-func (e *escaper) arbitraryTemplate() *Template {
-	for _, t := range e.ns.set {
-		return t
-	}
-	panic("no templates in name space")
-}
-
-var (
-	errorType       = reflect.TypeOf((*error)(nil)).Elem()
-	fmtStringerType = reflect.TypeOf((*fmt.Stringer)(nil)).Elem()
-)
-
-// indirectToStringerOrError returns the value, after dereferencing as many times
-// as necessary to reach the base type (or nil) or an implementation of fmt.Stringer
-// or error,
-func indirectToStringerOrError(a interface{}) interface{} {
-	if a == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	v := reflect.ValueOf(a)
-	for !v.Type().Implements(fmtStringerType) && !v.Type().Implements(errorType) && v.Kind() == reflect.Ptr && !v.IsNil() {
-		v = v.Elem()
-	}
-	return v.Interface()
-}
-
-var (
-	jsTemplateSeparator = []byte("`")
-	jsTemplateExprStart = []byte("${")
-	jsTemplateExprEnd   = []byte("}")
-)
-
-// Determine if a string has unbalanced (open) JS templates.
-func isJsTemplateBalanced(s *bytes.Buffer) error {
-	for {
-		index := bytes.Index(s.Bytes(), jsTemplateSeparator)
-		if index == -1 {
-			return nil
-		}
-		s.Next(index + 1)
-		err := consumeJsTemplate(s)
-		if err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// s is a JS template string (without the opening `); this function consumes s up to
-// the matching closing `.
-func consumeJsTemplate(s *bytes.Buffer) error {
-	for {
-		templateEnd := bytes.Index(s.Bytes(), jsTemplateSeparator)
-		exprStart := bytes.Index(s.Bytes(), jsTemplateExprStart)
-		if templateEnd == -1 {
-			return fmt.Errorf("Missing closing ` in JS template")
-		}
-		if exprStart != -1 && exprStart < templateEnd {
-			err := consumeJsTemplateExpr(s)
-			if err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			return consumeJsTemplate(s)
-		} else {
-			// The template expression occurs after this template, e.g. "`foo``bar${test}`".
-			s.Next(templateEnd + 1)
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// s is a Js Template expression (starting with "${"). This function consumes up to and including the matching closing "}".
-func consumeJsTemplateExpr(s *bytes.Buffer) error {
-	for {
-		exprEnd := bytes.Index(s.Bytes(), jsTemplateExprEnd)
-		if exprEnd == -1 {
-			// Template expression isn't closed
-			return fmt.Errorf("Missing closing } in JS template")
-		}
-		nestedTemplateStart := bytes.Index(s.Bytes(), jsTemplateSeparator)
-		if nestedTemplateStart != -1 && nestedTemplateStart < exprEnd {
-			s.Next(nestedTemplateStart + 1)
-			err := consumeJsTemplate(s)
-			if err != nil {
-				return err
-			}
-			return consumeJsTemplateExpr(s)
-		} else {
-			s.Next(exprEnd + 1)
-			return nil
-		}
-	}
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/init.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/init.go
deleted file mode 100644
index c9fa2de1d..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/init.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"github.com/google/safehtml/internal/template/raw"
-)
-
-// The following functions are used by package uncheckedconversions
-// (via package raw) to create TrustedSource and TrustedTemplate values
-// from plain strings.
-
-func trustedSourceRaw(s string) TrustedSource {
-	return TrustedSource{s}
-}
-
-func trustedTemplateRaw(s string) TrustedTemplate {
-	return TrustedTemplate{s}
-}
-
-func init() {
-	raw.TrustedSource = trustedSourceRaw
-	raw.TrustedTemplate = trustedTemplateRaw
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitize.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitize.go
deleted file mode 100644
index c75e345e1..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitize.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,258 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// sanitizerForContext returns an ordered list of function names that will be called to
-// sanitize data values found in the HTML context defined by c.
-func sanitizerForContext(c context) ([]string, error) {
-	switch c.state {
-	case stateTag, stateAttrName, stateAfterName:
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("actions must not affect element or attribute names")
-	case stateHTMLCmt:
-		return []string{sanitizeHTMLCommentFuncName}, nil
-	}
-	if len(c.element.names) == 0 && c.element.name == "" && c.state == stateText {
-		// Not in an HTML element.
-		return []string{sanitizeHTMLFuncName}, nil
-	}
-	if c.attr.name != "" || len(c.attr.names) > 0 {
-		// We are in an attribute value context.
-		if c.delim != delimDoubleQuote && c.delim != delimSingleQuote {
-			// TODO: consider disallowing single-quoted or unquoted attribute values completely, even in hardcoded template text.
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("unquoted attribute values disallowed")
-		}
-		return sanitizersForAttributeValue(c)
-	}
-	// Otherwise, we are in an element content context.
-	elementContentSanitizer, err := sanitizerForElementContent(c)
-	return appendIfNotEmpty([]string{}, elementContentSanitizer), err
-}
-
-// appendIfNotEmpty appends the given strings that are non-empty to the given slice.
-func appendIfNotEmpty(slice []string, strings ...string) []string {
-	for _, s := range strings {
-		if s != "" {
-			slice = append(slice, s)
-		}
-	}
-	return slice
-}
-
-// sanitizersForAttributeValue returns a list of names of functions that will be
-// called in order to sanitize data values found the HTML attribtue value context c.
-func sanitizersForAttributeValue(c context) ([]string, error) {
-	// Ensure that all combinations of element and attribute names for this context results
-	// in the same attribute value sanitization context.
-	var elems, attrs []string
-	if len(c.element.names) == 0 {
-		elems = []string{c.element.name}
-	} else {
-		elems = c.element.names
-	}
-	if len(c.attr.names) == 0 {
-		attrs = []string{c.attr.name}
-	} else {
-		attrs = c.attr.names
-	}
-	var sc0 sanitizationContext
-	var elem0, attr0 string
-	for i, elem := range elems {
-		for j, attr := range attrs {
-			sc, err := sanitizationContextForAttrVal(elem, attr, c.linkRel)
-			if err != nil {
-				if len(elems) == 1 && len(attrs) == 1 {
-					return nil, err
-				}
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf(`conditional branch with {element=%q, attribute=%q} results in sanitization error: %s`, elem, attr, err)
-			}
-			if i == 0 && j == 0 {
-				sc0, elem0, attr0 = sc, elem, attr
-				continue
-			}
-			if sc != sc0 {
-				return nil, fmt.Errorf(
-					`conditional branches end in different attribute value sanitization contexts: {element=%q, attribute=%q} has sanitization context %q, {element=%q, attribute=%q} has sanitization context %q`,
-					elem0, attr0, sc0, elem, attr, sc)
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if sc0.isEnum() && c.attr.value != "" {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("partial substitutions are disallowed in the %q attribute value context of a %q element", c.attr.name, c.element.name)
-	}
-	if sc0 == sanitizationContextStyle && c.attr.value != "" {
-		if err := validateDoesNotEndsWithCharRefPrefix(c.attr.value); err != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("action cannot be interpolated into the %q attribute value of this %q element: %s", c.attr.name, c.element.name, err)
-		}
-	}
-	// ret is a stack of sanitizer names that will be built in reverse.
-	var ret []string
-	// All attribute values must be HTML-escaped at run time by sanitizeHTML to eliminate
-	// any HTML markup that can cause the HTML parser to transition out of the attribute value state.
-	// These attribute values will later be HTML-unescaped by the HTML parser in the browser.
-	ret = append(ret, sanitizeHTMLFuncName)
-	sanitizer := sc0.sanitizerName()
-	if !sc0.isURLorTrustedResourceURL() {
-		return reverse(appendIfNotEmpty(ret, sanitizer)), nil
-	}
-	urlAttrValPrefix := c.attr.value
-	if urlAttrValPrefix == "" {
-		// Attribute value prefixes in URL or TrustedResourceURL sanitization contexts
-		// must sanitized and normalized.
-		return reverse(appendIfNotEmpty(ret, normalizeURLFuncName, sanitizer)), nil
-	}
-	// Action occurs after a URL or TrustedResourceURL prefix.
-	if c.attr.ambiguousValue {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("actions must not occur after an ambiguous URL prefix in the %q attribute value context of a %q element", c.attr.name, c.element.name)
-	}
-	validator, ok := urlPrefixValidators[sc0]
-	if !ok {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot validate attribute value prefix %q in the %q sanitization context", c.attr.value, sc0)
-	}
-	if err := validator(c.attr.value); err != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("action cannot be interpolated into the %q URL attribute value of this %q element: %s", c.attr.name, c.element.name, err)
-	}
-	switch {
-	case sc0 == sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL:
-		// Untrusted data that occurs anywhere after TrustedResourceURL prefix must be query-escaped
-		// to prevent the injection of any new path segments or URL components. Moreover, they must
-		// not contain any ".." dot-segments.
-		ret = append(ret, queryEscapeURLFuncName, validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitutionFuncName)
-	case strings.ContainsAny(urlAttrValPrefix, "#?"):
-		// For URLs, we only escape in the query or fragment part to prevent the injection of new query
-		// parameters or fragments.
-		ret = append(ret, queryEscapeURLFuncName)
-	default:
-		ret = append(ret, normalizeURLFuncName)
-	}
-	return reverse(ret), nil
-}
-
-// reverse reverses s and returns it.
-func reverse(s []string) []string {
-	for head, tail := 0, len(s)-1; head < tail; head, tail = head+1, tail-1 {
-		s[head], s[tail] = s[tail], s[head]
-	}
-	return s
-}
-
-// sanitizationContextForAttrVal returns the sanitization context for attr when it
-// appears within element.
-func sanitizationContextForAttrVal(element, attr, linkRel string) (sanitizationContext, error) {
-	if element == "link" && attr == "href" {
-		// Special case: safehtml.URL values are allowed in a link element's href attribute if that element's
-		// rel attribute possesses certain values.
-		relVals := strings.Fields(linkRel)
-		for _, val := range relVals {
-			if urlLinkRelVals[val] {
-				return sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL, nil
-			}
-		}
-	}
-	if dataAttributeNamePattern.MatchString(attr) {
-		// Special case: data-* attributes are specified by HTML5 to hold custom data private to
-		// the page or application; they should not be interpreted by browsers. Therefore, no
-		// sanitization is required for these attribute values.
-		return sanitizationContextNone, nil
-	}
-	if sc, ok := elementSpecificAttrValSanitizationContext[attr][element]; ok {
-		return sc, nil
-	}
-	sc, isAllowedAttr := globalAttrValSanitizationContext[attr]
-	_, isAllowedElement := elementContentSanitizationContext[element]
-	if isAllowedAttr && (isAllowedElement || allowedVoidElements[element]) {
-		// Only sanitize attributes that appear in elements whose semantics are known.
-		// Thes attributes might have different semantics in other standard or custom
-		// elements that our sanitization policy does not handle correctly.
-		return sc, nil
-	}
-	return 0, fmt.Errorf("actions must not occur in the %q attribute value context of a %q element", attr, element)
-}
-
-// dataAttributeNamePattern matches valid data attribute names.
-// This pattern is conservative and matches only a subset of the valid names defined in
-// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes
-var dataAttributeNamePattern = regexp.MustCompile(`^data-[a-z_][-a-z0-9_]*$`)
-
-// endsWithCharRefPrefixPattern matches strings that end in an incomplete
-// HTML character reference.
-//
-// See https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/syntax.html#character-references.
-var endsWithCharRefPrefixPattern = regexp.MustCompile(
-	`&(?:[[:alpha:]][[:alnum:]]*|#(?:[xX][[:xdigit:]]*|[[:digit:]]*))?$`)
-
-// validateDoesNotEndsWithCharRefPrefix returns an error only if the given prefix ends
-// with an incomplete HTML character reference.
-func validateDoesNotEndsWithCharRefPrefix(prefix string) error {
-	if endsWithCharRefPrefixPattern.MatchString(prefix) {
-		return fmt.Errorf(`prefix %q ends with an incomplete HTML character reference; did you mean "&amp;" instead of "&"?`, prefix)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// sanitizerForElementContent returns the name of the function that will be called
-// to sanitize data values found in the HTML element content context c.
-func sanitizerForElementContent(c context) (string, error) {
-	// Ensure that all other possible element names for this context result in the same
-	// element content sanitization context.
-	var elems []string
-	if len(c.element.names) == 0 {
-		elems = []string{c.element.name}
-	} else {
-		elems = c.element.names
-	}
-	var sc0 sanitizationContext
-	var elem0 string
-	for i, elem := range elems {
-		var sc sanitizationContext
-		var err error
-		if elem == "" {
-			// Special case: an empty element name represents a context outside of a HTML element.
-			sc = sanitizationContextHTML
-		} else {
-			sc, err = sanitizationContextForElementContent(elem)
-		}
-		if err != nil {
-			if len(elems) == 1 {
-				return "", err
-			}
-			return "", fmt.Errorf(`conditional branch with element %q results in sanitization error: %s`, elem, err)
-		}
-		if i == 0 {
-			sc0, elem0 = sc, elem
-			continue
-		}
-		if sc != sc0 {
-			return "",
-				fmt.Errorf(`conditional branches end in different element content sanitization contexts: element %q has sanitization context %q, element %q has sanitization context %q`,
-					elem0, sc0, elem, sc)
-		}
-	}
-	return sc0.sanitizerName(), nil
-}
-
-// sanitizationContextForElementContent returns the element content sanitization context for the given element.
-func sanitizationContextForElementContent(element string) (sanitizationContext, error) {
-	sc, ok := elementContentSanitizationContext[element]
-	if !ok {
-		return 0, fmt.Errorf("actions must not occur in the element content context of a %q element", element)
-	}
-	return sc, nil
-}
-
-// sanitizeHTMLComment returns the empty string regardless of input.
-// Comment content does not correspond to any parsed structure or
-// human-readable content, so the simplest and most secure policy is to drop
-// content interpolated into comments.
-// This approach is equally valid whether or not static comment content is
-// removed from the template.
-func sanitizeHTMLComment(_ ...interface{}) string {
-	return ""
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitizers.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitizers.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 782e931b8..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/sanitizers.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,599 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"text/template"
-
-	"github.com/google/safehtml/internal/safehtmlutil"
-	"github.com/google/safehtml"
-)
-
-// sanitizationContext determines what type of sanitization to perform
-// on a template action.
-type sanitizationContext uint8
-
-const (
-	_ = iota
-	sanitizationContextAsyncEnum
-	sanitizationContextDirEnum
-	sanitizationContextHTML
-	sanitizationContextHTMLValOnly
-	sanitizationContextIdentifier
-	sanitizationContextLoadingEnum
-	sanitizationContextNone
-	sanitizationContextRCDATA
-	sanitizationContextScript
-	sanitizationContextStyle
-	sanitizationContextStyleSheet
-	sanitizationContextTargetEnum
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL
-	sanitizationContextURL
-	sanitizationContextURLSet
-)
-
-// String returns the string representation of sanitizationContext s.
-func (s sanitizationContext) String() string {
-	if int(s) >= len(sanitizationContextInfo) {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("invalid sanitization context %d", s)
-	}
-	return sanitizationContextInfo[s].name
-}
-
-// sanitizerName returns the name of the sanitizer to call in sanitizationContext s.
-// It returns an empty string if no sanitization is required in s.
-func (s sanitizationContext) sanitizerName() string {
-	if int(s) >= len(sanitizationContextInfo) {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("invalid sanitization context %d", s)
-	}
-	return sanitizationContextInfo[s].sanitizerName
-}
-
-// isEnum reports reports whether s is a sanitization context for enumerated values.
-func (s sanitizationContext) isEnum() bool {
-	return s == sanitizationContextAsyncEnum || s == sanitizationContextDirEnum || s == sanitizationContextLoadingEnum || s == sanitizationContextTargetEnum
-}
-
-// isURLorTrustedResourceURL reports reports whether s is a sanitization context for URL or TrustedResourceURL values.
-func (s sanitizationContext) isURLorTrustedResourceURL() bool {
-	return s == sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL || s == sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL || s == sanitizationContextURL
-}
-
-// sanitizationContextInfo[x] contains the name for sanitization context x and the
-// name of the sanitizer to call in that context.
-// If sanitizationContextInfo[x].sanitizerName is empty, then no sanitizer needs
-// to be called in x.
-var sanitizationContextInfo = [...]struct {
-	name, sanitizerName string
-}{
-	sanitizationContextAsyncEnum:               {"AsyncEnum", sanitizeAsyncEnumFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextDirEnum:                 {"DirEnum", sanitizeDirEnumFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextHTML:                    {"HTML", sanitizeHTMLFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextHTMLValOnly:             {"HTMLValOnly", sanitizeHTMLValOnlyFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextIdentifier:              {"Identifier", sanitizeIdentifierFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextLoadingEnum:             {"LoadingEnum", sanitizeLoadingEnumFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextNone:                    {"None", ""},
-	sanitizationContextRCDATA:                  {"RCDATA", sanitizeRCDATAFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextScript:                  {"Script", sanitizeScriptFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextStyle:                   {"Style", sanitizeStyleFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextStyleSheet:              {"StyleSheet", sanitizeStyleSheetFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextTargetEnum:              {"TargetEnum", sanitizeTargetEnumFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL:      {"TrustedResourceURL", sanitizeTrustedResourceURLFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL: {"TrustedResourceURLOrURL", sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURLFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextURL:                     {"URL", sanitizeURLFuncName},
-	sanitizationContextURLSet:                  {"URLSet", sanitizeURLSetFuncName},
-}
-
-var funcs = template.FuncMap{
-	queryEscapeURLFuncName:                         safehtmlutil.QueryEscapeURL,
-	normalizeURLFuncName:                           safehtmlutil.NormalizeURL,
-	validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitutionFuncName: validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitution,
-	evalArgsFuncName:                               evalArgs,
-	sanitizeHTMLCommentFuncName:                    sanitizeHTMLComment,
-	sanitizeAsyncEnumFuncName:                      sanitizeAsyncEnum,
-	sanitizeDirEnumFuncName:                        sanitizeDirEnum,
-	sanitizeHTMLFuncName:                           sanitizeHTML,
-	sanitizeHTMLValOnlyFuncName:                    sanitizeHTMLValOnly,
-	sanitizeIdentifierFuncName:                     sanitizeIdentifier,
-	sanitizeLoadingEnumFuncName:                    sanitizeLoadingEnum,
-	sanitizeRCDATAFuncName:                         sanitizeRCDATA,
-	sanitizeScriptFuncName:                         sanitizeScript,
-	sanitizeStyleFuncName:                          sanitizeStyle,
-	sanitizeStyleSheetFuncName:                     sanitizeStyleSheet,
-	sanitizeTargetEnumFuncName:                     sanitizeTargetEnum,
-	sanitizeTrustedResourceURLFuncName:             sanitizeTrustedResourceURL,
-	sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURLFuncName:        sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-	sanitizeURLFuncName:                            sanitizeURL,
-	sanitizeURLSetFuncName:                         sanitizeURLSet,
-}
-
-const (
-	queryEscapeURLFuncName                         = "_queryEscapeURL"
-	normalizeURLFuncName                           = "_normalizeURL"
-	validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitutionFuncName = "_validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitution"
-	evalArgsFuncName                               = "_evalArgs"
-	sanitizeHTMLCommentFuncName                    = "_sanitizeHTMLComment"
-	sanitizeAsyncEnumFuncName                      = "_sanitizeAsyncEnum"
-	sanitizeDirEnumFuncName                        = "_sanitizeDirEnum"
-	sanitizeHTMLFuncName                           = "_sanitizeHTML"
-	sanitizeHTMLValOnlyFuncName                    = "_sanitizeHTMLValOnly"
-	sanitizeIdentifierFuncName                     = "_sanitizeIdentifier"
-	sanitizeLoadingEnumFuncName                    = "_sanitizeLoadingEnum"
-	sanitizeRCDATAFuncName                         = "_sanitizeRCDATA"
-	sanitizeScriptFuncName                         = "_sanitizeScript"
-	sanitizeStyleFuncName                          = "_sanitizeStyle"
-	sanitizeStyleSheetFuncName                     = "_sanitizeStyleSheet"
-	sanitizeTargetEnumFuncName                     = "_sanitizeTargetEnum"
-	sanitizeTrustedResourceURLFuncName             = "_sanitizeTrustedResourceURL"
-	sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURLFuncName        = "_sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL"
-	sanitizeURLFuncName                            = "_sanitizeURL"
-	sanitizeURLSetFuncName                         = "_sanitizeURLSet"
-)
-
-// urlLinkRelVals contains values for a link element's rel attribute that indicate that the same link
-// element's href attribute may contain a safehtml.URL value.
-var urlLinkRelVals = map[string]bool{
-	"alternate":    true,
-	"author":       true,
-	"bookmark":     true,
-	"canonical":    true,
-	"cite":         true,
-	"dns-prefetch": true,
-	"help":         true,
-	"icon":         true,
-	"license":      true,
-	"next":         true,
-	"preconnect":   true,
-	"prefetch":     true,
-	"preload":      true,
-	"prerender":    true,
-	"prev":         true,
-	"search":       true,
-	"subresource":  true,
-}
-
-// elementSpecificAttrValSanitizationContext[x][y] is the sanitization context for
-// attribute x when it appears within element y.
-var elementSpecificAttrValSanitizationContext = map[string]map[string]sanitizationContext{
-	"accept": {
-		"input": sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"action": {
-		"form": sanitizationContextURL,
-	},
-	"defer": {
-		"script": sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"formaction": {
-		"button": sanitizationContextURL,
-		"input":  sanitizationContextURL,
-	},
-	"formmethod": {
-		"button": sanitizationContextNone,
-		"input":  sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"href": {
-		"a":    sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-		"area": sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-	},
-	"method": {
-		"form": sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"pattern": {
-		"input": sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"readonly": {
-		"input":    sanitizationContextNone,
-		"textarea": sanitizationContextNone,
-	},
-	"src": {
-		"audio":  sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-		"img":    sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-		"input":  sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-		"source": sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-		"video":  sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL,
-	},
-	"srcdoc": {
-		"iframe": sanitizationContextHTMLValOnly,
-	},
-}
-
-// globalAttrValSanitizationContext[x] is the sanitization context for attribute x when
-// it appears within any element not in the key set of elementSpecificAttrValSanitizationContext[x].
-var globalAttrValSanitizationContext = map[string]sanitizationContext{
-	"align":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"alt":                   sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-activedescendant": sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"aria-atomic":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-autocomplete":     sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-busy":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-checked":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-controls":         sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"aria-current":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-disabled":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-dropeffect":       sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-expanded":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-haspopup":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-hidden":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-invalid":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-label":            sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-labelledby":       sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"aria-level":            sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-live":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-multiline":        sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-multiselectable":  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-orientation":      sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-owns":             sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"aria-posinset":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-pressed":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-readonly":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-relevant":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-required":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-selected":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-setsize":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-sort":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-valuemax":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-valuemin":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-valuenow":         sanitizationContextNone,
-	"aria-valuetext":        sanitizationContextNone,
-	"async":                 sanitizationContextAsyncEnum,
-	"autocapitalize":        sanitizationContextNone,
-	"autocomplete":          sanitizationContextNone,
-	"autocorrect":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"autofocus":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"autoplay":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"bgcolor":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"border":                sanitizationContextNone,
-	"cellpadding":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"cellspacing":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"checked":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"cite":                  sanitizationContextURL,
-	"class":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"color":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"cols":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"colspan":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"contenteditable":       sanitizationContextNone,
-	"controls":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"datetime":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"dir":                   sanitizationContextDirEnum,
-	"disabled":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"download":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"draggable":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"enctype":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"face":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"for":                   sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"formenctype":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"frameborder":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"height":                sanitizationContextNone,
-	"hidden":                sanitizationContextNone,
-	"href":                  sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL,
-	"hreflang":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"id":                    sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"ismap":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"itemid":                sanitizationContextNone,
-	"itemprop":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"itemref":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"itemscope":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"itemtype":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"label":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"lang":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"list":                  sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"loading":               sanitizationContextLoadingEnum,
-	"loop":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"max":                   sanitizationContextNone,
-	"maxlength":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"media":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"min":                   sanitizationContextNone,
-	"minlength":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"multiple":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"muted":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"name":                  sanitizationContextIdentifier,
-	"nonce":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"open":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"placeholder":           sanitizationContextNone,
-	"poster":                sanitizationContextURL,
-	"preload":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"rel":                   sanitizationContextNone,
-	"required":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"reversed":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"role":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"rows":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"rowspan":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"selected":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"shape":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"size":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"sizes":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"slot":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"span":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"spellcheck":            sanitizationContextNone,
-	"src":                   sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL,
-	"srcset":                sanitizationContextURLSet,
-	"start":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"step":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"style":                 sanitizationContextStyle,
-	"summary":               sanitizationContextNone,
-	"tabindex":              sanitizationContextNone,
-	"target":                sanitizationContextTargetEnum,
-	"title":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"translate":             sanitizationContextNone,
-	"type":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-	"valign":                sanitizationContextNone,
-	"value":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"width":                 sanitizationContextNone,
-	"wrap":                  sanitizationContextNone,
-}
-
-// elementContentSanitizationContext maps element names to element content sanitization contexts.
-var elementContentSanitizationContext = map[string]sanitizationContext{
-	"a":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"abbr":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"address":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"article":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"aside":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"audio":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"b":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"bdi":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"bdo":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"blockquote": sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"body":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"button":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"canvas":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"caption":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"center":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"cite":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"code":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"colgroup":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"command":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"data":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"datalist":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"dd":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"del":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"details":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"dfn":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"dialog":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"div":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"dl":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"dt":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"em":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"fieldset":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"figcaption": sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"figure":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"font":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"footer":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"form":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"frame":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"frameset":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h1":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h2":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h3":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h4":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h5":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"h6":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"head":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"header":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"html":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"i":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"iframe":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"ins":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"kbd":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"label":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"legend":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"lh":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"li":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"main":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"map":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"mark":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"menu":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"meter":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"nav":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"noscript":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"ol":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"optgroup":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"option":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"output":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"p":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"picture":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"pre":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"progress":   sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"q":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"rb":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"rp":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"rt":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"rtc":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"ruby":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"s":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"samp":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"script":     sanitizationContextScript,
-	"section":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"select":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"slot":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"small":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"span":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"strong":     sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"style":      sanitizationContextStyleSheet,
-	"sub":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"summary":    sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"sup":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"table":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"tbody":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"td":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"textarea":   sanitizationContextRCDATA,
-	"tfoot":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"th":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"thead":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"time":       sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"title":      sanitizationContextRCDATA,
-	"tr":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"u":          sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"ul":         sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"var":        sanitizationContextHTML,
-	"video":      sanitizationContextHTML,
-}
-
-// allowedVoidElements is a set of names of void elements actions may appear in.
-var allowedVoidElements = map[string]bool{
-	"area":   true,
-	"br":     true,
-	"col":    true,
-	"hr":     true,
-	"img":    true,
-	"input":  true,
-	"link":   true,
-	"param":  true,
-	"source": true,
-	"track":  true,
-	"wbr":    true,
-}
-
-var sanitizeAsyncEnumValues = map[string]bool{
-	"async": true,
-}
-
-func sanitizeAsyncEnum(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	if sanitizeAsyncEnumValues[input] {
-		return input, nil
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected one of the following strings: ["async"]`)
-}
-
-var sanitizeDirEnumValues = map[string]bool{
-	"auto": true,
-	"ltr":  true,
-	"rtl":  true,
-}
-
-func sanitizeDirEnum(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	if sanitizeDirEnumValues[input] {
-		return input, nil
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected one of the following strings: ["auto" "ltr" "rtl"]`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeHTML(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.HTML); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	return safehtml.HTMLEscaped(input).String(), nil
-}
-
-func sanitizeHTMLValOnly(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.HTML); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.HTML value`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeIdentifier(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.Identifier); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.Identifier value`)
-}
-
-var sanitizeLoadingEnumValues = map[string]bool{
-	"eager": true,
-	"lazy":  true,
-}
-
-func sanitizeLoadingEnum(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	if sanitizeLoadingEnumValues[input] {
-		return input, nil
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected one of the following strings: ["eager" "lazy"]`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeRCDATA(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	return safehtml.HTMLEscaped(input).String(), nil
-}
-
-func sanitizeScript(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.Script); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.Script value`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeStyle(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.Style); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.Style value`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeStyleSheet(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.StyleSheet); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.StyleSheet value`)
-}
-
-var sanitizeTargetEnumValues = map[string]bool{
-	"_blank": true,
-	"_self":  true,
-}
-
-func sanitizeTargetEnum(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	if sanitizeTargetEnumValues[input] {
-		return input, nil
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected one of the following strings: ["_blank" "_self"]`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeTrustedResourceURL(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.TrustedResourceURL); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	return "", fmt.Errorf(`expected a safehtml.TrustedResourceURL value`)
-}
-
-func sanitizeTrustedResourceURLOrURL(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		switch v := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(type) {
-		case safehtml.TrustedResourceURL, safehtml.URL:
-			return safehtmlutil.Stringify(v), nil
-		}
-	}
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	return safehtml.URLSanitized(input).String(), nil
-}
-
-func sanitizeURL(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	if len(args) > 0 {
-		if safeTypeValue, ok := safehtmlutil.Indirect(args[0]).(safehtml.URL); ok {
-			return safeTypeValue.String(), nil
-		}
-	}
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	return safehtml.URLSanitized(input).String(), nil
-}
-
-func sanitizeURLSet(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	return safehtml.URLSetSanitized(input).String(), nil
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/state_string.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/state_string.go
deleted file mode 100644
index afbbf5a0d..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/state_string.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-// Code generated by "stringer -type State"; DO NOT EDIT
-
-package template
-
-import "fmt"
-
-const _State_name = "StateTextStateSpecialElementBodyStateTagStateAttrNameStateAfterNameStateBeforeValueStateHTMLCmtStateAttrStateError"
-
-var _State_index = [...]uint16{0, 9, 32, 40, 53, 67, 83, 95, 104, 114}
-
-func (i state) String() string {
-	if i >= state(len(_State_index)-1) {
-		return fmt.Sprintf("state(%d)", i)
-	}
-	return _State_name[_State_index[i]:_State_index[i+1]]
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/template.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/template.go
deleted file mode 100644
index efd0ef610..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/template.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,651 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"fmt"
-	"io"
-	"io/ioutil"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"sync"
-	"text/template"
-	"text/template/parse"
-
-	"log"
-	"github.com/google/safehtml"
-	"github.com/google/safehtml/uncheckedconversions"
-)
-
-// Template is a specialized Template from "text/template" that produces a safe
-// HTML document fragment.
-type Template struct {
-	// Sticky error if escaping fails, or errEscapeOK if succeeded.
-	escapeErr error
-	// We could embed the text/template field, but it's safer not to because
-	// we need to keep our version of the name space and the underlying
-	// template's in sync.
-	text *template.Template
-	// The underlying template's parse tree, updated to be HTML-safe.
-	Tree       *parse.Tree
-	*nameSpace // common to all associated templates
-}
-
-// errEscapeOK is a sentinel value used to indicate valid escaping.
-var errEscapeOK = fmt.Errorf("template escaped correctly")
-
-// nameSpace is the data structure shared by all templates in an association.
-type nameSpace struct {
-	mu      sync.Mutex
-	set     map[string]*Template
-	escaped bool
-	// cspCompatible indicates whether inline event handlers and
-	// javascript: URIs are disallowed in templates in this namespace.
-	cspCompatible bool
-	esc           escaper
-}
-
-// Templates returns a slice of the templates associated with t, including t
-// itself.
-func (t *Template) Templates() []*Template {
-	ns := t.nameSpace
-	ns.mu.Lock()
-	defer ns.mu.Unlock()
-	// Return a slice so we don't expose the map.
-	m := make([]*Template, 0, len(ns.set))
-	for _, v := range ns.set {
-		m = append(m, v)
-	}
-	return m
-}
-
-// Option sets options for the template. Options are described by
-// strings, either a simple string or "key=value". There can be at
-// most one equals sign in an option string. If the option string
-// is unrecognized or otherwise invalid, Option panics.
-//
-// Known options:
-//
-// missingkey: Control the behavior during execution if a map is
-// indexed with a key that is not present in the map.
-//	"missingkey=default" or "missingkey=invalid"
-//		The default behavior: Do nothing and continue execution.
-//		If printed, the result of the index operation is the string
-//		"<no value>".
-//	"missingkey=zero"
-//		The operation returns the zero value for the map type's element.
-//	"missingkey=error"
-//		Execution stops immediately with an error.
-//
-func (t *Template) Option(opt ...string) *Template {
-	t.text.Option(opt...)
-	return t
-}
-
-// checkCanParse checks whether it is OK to parse templates.
-// If not, it returns an error.
-func (t *Template) checkCanParse() error {
-	if t == nil {
-		return nil
-	}
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	if t.nameSpace.escaped {
-		return fmt.Errorf("html/template: cannot Parse after Execute")
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// escape escapes all associated templates.
-func (t *Template) escape() error {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	t.nameSpace.escaped = true
-	if t.escapeErr == nil {
-		if t.Tree == nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("template: %q is an incomplete or empty template", t.Name())
-		}
-		if err := escapeTemplate(t, t.text.Root, t.Name()); err != nil {
-			return err
-		}
-	} else if t.escapeErr != errEscapeOK {
-		return t.escapeErr
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// Execute applies a parsed template to the specified data object,
-// writing the output to wr.
-// If an error occurs executing the template or writing its output,
-// execution stops, but partial results may already have been written to
-// the output writer.
-// A template may be executed safely in parallel, although if parallel
-// executions share a Writer the output may be interleaved.
-func (t *Template) Execute(wr io.Writer, data interface{}) error {
-	if err := t.escape(); err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return t.text.Execute(wr, data)
-}
-
-// ExecuteToHTML applies a parsed template to the specified data object,
-// returning the output as a safehtml.HTML value.
-// A template may be executed safely in parallel.
-func (t *Template) ExecuteToHTML(data interface{}) (safehtml.HTML, error) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	if err := t.Execute(&buf, data); err != nil {
-		return safehtml.HTML{}, err
-	}
-	return uncheckedconversions.HTMLFromStringKnownToSatisfyTypeContract(buf.String()), nil
-}
-
-// MustParseAndExecuteToHTML is a helper that returns the safehtml.HTML value produced
-// by parsing text as a template body and executing it with no data. Any errors
-// encountered parsing or executing the template are fatal. This function is intended
-// to produce safehtml.HTML values from static HTML snippets such as
-//
-//	html := MustParseAndExecuteToHTML("<b>Important</b>")
-//
-// To guarantee that the template body is never controlled by an attacker, text
-// must be an untyped string constant, which is always under programmer control.
-func MustParseAndExecuteToHTML(text stringConstant) safehtml.HTML {
-	t, err := New("").Parse(text)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	html, err := t.ExecuteToHTML(nil)
-	if err != nil {
-		log.Fatal(err)
-	}
-	return html
-}
-
-// ExecuteTemplate applies the template associated with t that has the given
-// name to the specified data object and writes the output to wr.
-// If an error occurs executing the template or writing its output,
-// execution stops, but partial results may already have been written to
-// the output writer.
-// A template may be executed safely in parallel, although if parallel
-// executions share a Writer the output may be interleaved.
-func (t *Template) ExecuteTemplate(wr io.Writer, name string, data interface{}) error {
-	tmpl, err := t.lookupAndEscapeTemplate(name)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	return tmpl.text.Execute(wr, data)
-}
-
-// ExecuteTemplateToHTML applies the template associated with t that has
-// the given name to the specified data object and returns the output as
-// a safehtml.HTML value.
-// A template may be executed safely in parallel.
-func (t *Template) ExecuteTemplateToHTML(name string, data interface{}) (safehtml.HTML, error) {
-	var buf bytes.Buffer
-	if err := t.ExecuteTemplate(&buf, name, data); err != nil {
-		return safehtml.HTML{}, err
-	}
-	return uncheckedconversions.HTMLFromStringKnownToSatisfyTypeContract(buf.String()), nil
-}
-
-// lookupAndEscapeTemplate guarantees that the template with the given name
-// is escaped, or returns an error if it cannot be. It returns the named
-// template.
-func (t *Template) lookupAndEscapeTemplate(name string) (tmpl *Template, err error) {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	t.nameSpace.escaped = true
-	tmpl = t.set[name]
-	if tmpl == nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: %q is undefined", name)
-	}
-	if tmpl.escapeErr != nil && tmpl.escapeErr != errEscapeOK {
-		return nil, tmpl.escapeErr
-	}
-	if tmpl.text.Tree == nil || tmpl.text.Root == nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: %q is an incomplete template", name)
-	}
-	if t.text.Lookup(name) == nil {
-		panic("html/template internal error: template escaping out of sync")
-	}
-	if tmpl.escapeErr == nil {
-		err = escapeTemplate(tmpl, tmpl.text.Root, name)
-	}
-	return tmpl, err
-}
-
-// DefinedTemplates returns a string listing the defined templates,
-// prefixed by the string "; defined templates are: ". If there are none,
-// it returns the empty string. Used to generate an error message.
-func (t *Template) DefinedTemplates() string {
-	return t.text.DefinedTemplates()
-}
-
-// Parse parses text as a template body for t.
-// Named template definitions ({{define ...}} or {{block ...}} statements) in text
-// define additional templates associated with t and are removed from the
-// definition of t itself.
-//
-// Templates can be redefined in successive calls to Parse,
-// before the first use of Execute on t or any associated template.
-// A template definition with a body containing only white space and comments
-// is considered empty and will not replace an existing template's body.
-// This allows using Parse to add new named template definitions without
-// overwriting the main template body.
-//
-// To guarantee that the template body is never controlled by an attacker, text
-// must be an untyped string constant, which is always under programmer control.
-func (t *Template) Parse(text stringConstant) (*Template, error) {
-	if err := t.checkCanParse(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	ret, err := t.text.Parse(string(text))
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	// In general, all the named templates might have changed underfoot.
-	// Regardless, some new ones may have been defined.
-	// The template.Template set has been updated; update ours.
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	for _, v := range ret.Templates() {
-		name := v.Name()
-		tmpl := t.set[name]
-		if tmpl == nil {
-			tmpl = t.new(name)
-		}
-		tmpl.text = v
-		tmpl.Tree = v.Tree
-	}
-	return t, nil
-}
-
-// ParseFromTrustedTemplate parses tmpl as a template body for t.
-// Named template definitions ({{define ...}} or {{block ...}} statements) in text
-// define additional templates associated with t and are removed from the
-// definition of t itself.
-//
-// Templates can be redefined in successive calls to ParseFromTrustedTemplate,
-// before the first use of Execute on t or any associated template.
-// A template definition with a body containing only white space and comments
-// is considered empty and will not replace an existing template's body.
-// This allows using ParseFromTrustedTemplate to add new named template definitions without
-// overwriting the main template body.
-//
-// To guarantee that the template body is never controlled by an attacker, tmpl
-// is a TrustedTemplate, which is always under programmer control.
-func (t *Template) ParseFromTrustedTemplate(tmpl TrustedTemplate) (*Template, error) {
-	return t.Parse(stringConstant(tmpl.String()))
-}
-
-// Clone returns a duplicate of the template, including all associated
-// templates. The actual representation is not copied, but the name space of
-// associated templates is, so further calls to Parse in the copy will add
-// templates to the copy but not to the original. Clone can be used to prepare
-// common templates and use them with variant definitions for other templates
-// by adding the variants after the clone is made.
-//
-// It returns an error if t has already been executed.
-func (t *Template) Clone() (*Template, error) {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	if t.escapeErr != nil {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: cannot Clone %q after it has executed", t.Name())
-	}
-	textClone, err := t.text.Clone()
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	ns := &nameSpace{set: make(map[string]*Template)}
-	ns.esc = makeEscaper(ns)
-	ret := &Template{
-		nil,
-		textClone,
-		textClone.Tree,
-		ns,
-	}
-	ret.set[ret.Name()] = ret
-	for _, x := range textClone.Templates() {
-		name := x.Name()
-		src := t.set[name]
-		if src == nil || src.escapeErr != nil {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: cannot Clone %q after it has executed", t.Name())
-		}
-		x.Tree = x.Tree.Copy()
-		ret.set[name] = &Template{
-			nil,
-			x,
-			x.Tree,
-			ret.nameSpace,
-		}
-	}
-	// Return the template associated with the name of this template.
-	return ret.set[ret.Name()], nil
-}
-
-// New allocates a new HTML template with the given name.
-func New(name string) *Template {
-	ns := &nameSpace{set: make(map[string]*Template)}
-	ns.esc = makeEscaper(ns)
-	tmpl := &Template{
-		nil,
-		template.New(name),
-		nil,
-		ns,
-	}
-	tmpl.set[name] = tmpl
-	return tmpl
-}
-
-// New allocates a new HTML template associated with the given one
-// and with the same delimiters. The association, which is transitive,
-// allows one template to invoke another with a {{template}} action.
-//
-// If a template with the given name already exists, the new HTML template
-// will replace it. The existing template will be reset and disassociated with
-// t.
-func (t *Template) New(name string) *Template {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	return t.new(name)
-}
-
-// new is the implementation of New, without the lock.
-func (t *Template) new(name string) *Template {
-	tmpl := &Template{
-		nil,
-		t.text.New(name),
-		nil,
-		t.nameSpace,
-	}
-	if existing, ok := tmpl.set[name]; ok {
-		emptyTmpl := New(existing.Name())
-		*existing = *emptyTmpl
-	}
-	tmpl.set[name] = tmpl
-	return tmpl
-}
-
-// Name returns the name of the template.
-func (t *Template) Name() string {
-	return t.text.Name()
-}
-
-// FuncMap is the type of the map defining the mapping from names to
-// functions. Each function must have either a single return value, or two
-// return values of which the second has type error. In that case, if the
-// second (error) argument evaluates to non-nil during execution, execution
-// terminates and Execute returns that error. FuncMap has the same base type
-// as FuncMap in "text/template", copied here so clients need not import
-// "text/template".
-type FuncMap map[string]interface{}
-
-// Funcs adds the elements of the argument map to the template's function map.
-// It must be called before the template is parsed.
-// It panics if a value in the map is not a function with appropriate return
-// type. However, it is legal to overwrite elements of the map. The return
-// value is the template, so calls can be chained.
-func (t *Template) Funcs(funcMap FuncMap) *Template {
-	t.text.Funcs(template.FuncMap(funcMap))
-	return t
-}
-
-// CSPCompatible causes this template to check template text for
-// Content Security Policy (CSP) compatibility. The template will return errors
-// at execution time if inline event handler attribute names or javascript:
-// URIs are found in template text.
-//
-// For example, the following templates will cause errors:
-//     <span onclick="doThings();">A thing.</span> // inline event handler "onclick"
-//     <a href="javascript:linkClicked()">foo</a>  // javascript: URI present
-func (t *Template) CSPCompatible() *Template {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	t.nameSpace.cspCompatible = true
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	return t
-}
-
-// Delims sets the action delimiters to the specified strings, to be used in
-// subsequent calls to Parse, ParseFiles, or ParseGlob. Nested template
-// definitions will inherit the settings. An empty delimiter stands for the
-// corresponding default: {{ or }}.
-// The return value is the template, so calls can be chained.
-func (t *Template) Delims(left, right string) *Template {
-	t.text.Delims(left, right)
-	return t
-}
-
-// Lookup returns the template with the given name that is associated with t,
-// or nil if there is no such template.
-func (t *Template) Lookup(name string) *Template {
-	t.nameSpace.mu.Lock()
-	defer t.nameSpace.mu.Unlock()
-	return t.set[name]
-}
-
-// Must is a helper that wraps a call to a function returning (*Template, error)
-// and panics if the error is non-nil. It is intended for use in variable initializations
-// such as
-//	var t = template.Must(template.New("name").Parse("html"))
-func Must(t *Template, err error) *Template {
-	if err != nil {
-		panic(err)
-	}
-	return t
-}
-
-// stringConstant is an unexported string type. Users of this package cannot
-// create values of this type except by passing an untyped string constant to
-// functions which expect a stringConstant. This type must be used only in
-// function and method parameters.
-type stringConstant string
-
-func stringConstantsToStrings(strs []stringConstant) []string {
-	ret := make([]string, 0, len(strs))
-	for _, s := range strs {
-		ret = append(ret, string(s))
-	}
-	return ret
-}
-
-// ParseFiles creates a new Template and parses the template definitions from
-// the named files. The returned template's name will have the (base) name and
-// (parsed) contents of the first file. There must be at least one file.
-// If an error occurs, parsing stops and the returned *Template is nil.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-// For instance, ParseFiles("a/foo", "b/foo") stores "b/foo" as the template
-// named "foo", while "a/foo" is unavailable.
-//
-// To guarantee that filepaths, and thus template bodies, are never controlled by
-// an attacker, filenames must be untyped string constants, which are always under
-// programmer control.
-func ParseFiles(filenames ...stringConstant) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFiles(nil, readFileOS, stringConstantsToStrings(filenames)...)
-}
-
-// ParseFilesFromTrustedSources creates a new Template and parses the template definitions from
-// the named files. The returned template's name will have the (base) name and
-// (parsed) contents of the first file. There must be at least one file.
-// If an error occurs, parsing stops and the returned *Template is nil.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-// For instance, ParseFiles("a/foo", "b/foo") stores "b/foo" as the template
-// named "foo", while "a/foo" is unavailable.
-//
-// To guarantee that filepaths, and thus template bodies, are never controlled by
-// an attacker, filenames must be trusted sources, which are always under programmer
-// or application control.
-func ParseFilesFromTrustedSources(filenames ...TrustedSource) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFiles(nil, readFileOS, trustedSourcesToStrings(filenames)...)
-}
-
-// ParseFiles parses the named files and associates the resulting templates with
-// t. If an error occurs, parsing stops and the returned template is nil;
-// otherwise it is t. There must be at least one file.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-//
-// ParseFiles returns an error if t or any associated template has already been executed.
-//
-// To guarantee that filepaths, and thus template bodies, are never controlled by
-// an attacker, filenames must be untyped string constants, which are always under
-// programmer control.
-func (t *Template) ParseFiles(filenames ...stringConstant) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFiles(t, readFileOS, stringConstantsToStrings(filenames)...)
-}
-
-// ParseFilesFromTrustedSources parses the named files and associates the resulting templates with
-// t. If an error occurs, parsing stops and the returned template is nil;
-// otherwise it is t. There must be at least one file.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-//
-// ParseFilesFromTrustedSources returns an error if t or any associated template has already been executed.
-//
-// To guarantee that filepaths, and thus template bodies, are never controlled by
-// an attacker, filenames must be trusted sources, which are always under programmer
-// or application control.
-func (t *Template) ParseFilesFromTrustedSources(filenames ...TrustedSource) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFiles(t, readFileOS, trustedSourcesToStrings(filenames)...)
-}
-
-// parseFiles is the helper for the method and function. If the argument
-// template is nil, it is created from the first file.
-// readFile takes a filename and returns the file's basename and contents.
-func parseFiles(t *Template, readFile func(string) (string, []byte, error), filenames ...string) (*Template, error) {
-	if err := t.checkCanParse(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-
-	if len(filenames) == 0 {
-		// Not really a problem, but be consistent.
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: no files named in call to ParseFiles")
-	}
-	for _, filename := range filenames {
-		name, b, err := readFile(filename)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		s := stringConstant(b)
-		// First template becomes return value if not already defined,
-		// and we use that one for subsequent New calls to associate
-		// all the templates together. Also, if this file has the same name
-		// as t, this file becomes the contents of t, so
-		//  t, err := New(name).Funcs(xxx).ParseFiles(name)
-		// works. Otherwise we create a new template associated with t.
-		var tmpl *Template
-		if t == nil {
-			t = New(name)
-		}
-		if name == t.Name() {
-			tmpl = t
-		} else {
-			tmpl = t.New(name)
-		}
-		_, err = tmpl.Parse(s)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
-	return t, nil
-}
-
-// Copied with minor changes from
-// https://go.googlesource.com/go/+/refs/tags/go1.17.1/src/text/template/helper.go.
-func readFileOS(file string) (string, []byte, error) {
-	name := filepath.Base(file)
-	b, err := ioutil.ReadFile(file)
-	return name, b, err
-}
-
-// ParseGlob creates a new Template and parses the template definitions from the
-// files identified by the pattern, which must match at least one file. The
-// returned template will have the (base) name and (parsed) contents of the
-// first file matched by the pattern. ParseGlob is equivalent to calling
-// ParseFiles with the list of files matched by the pattern.
-//
-// To guarantee that the pattern, and thus the template bodies, is never controlled by
-// an attacker, pattern must be an untyped string constant, which is always under
-// programmer control.
-func ParseGlob(pattern stringConstant) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseGlob(nil, string(pattern))
-}
-
-// ParseGlobFromTrustedSource creates a new Template and parses the template definitions from the
-// files identified by the pattern, which must match at least one file. The
-// returned template will have the (base) name and (parsed) contents of the
-// first file matched by the pattern. ParseGlobFromTrustedSource is equivalent to calling
-// ParseFilesFromTrustedSources with the list of files matched by the pattern.
-//
-// To guarantee that the pattern, and thus the template bodies, is never controlled by
-// an attacker, pattern must be a trusted source, which is always under programmer or
-// application control.
-func ParseGlobFromTrustedSource(pattern TrustedSource) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseGlob(nil, pattern.String())
-}
-
-// ParseGlob parses the template definitions in the files identified by the
-// pattern and associates the resulting templates with t. The pattern is
-// processed by filepath.Glob and must match at least one file. ParseGlob is
-// equivalent to calling t.ParseFiles with the list of files matched by the
-// pattern.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-//
-// ParseGlob returns an error if t or any associated template has already been executed.
-//
-// To guarantee that the pattern, and thus the template bodies, is never controlled by
-// an attacker, pattern must be an untyped string constant, which is always under
-// programmer control.
-func (t *Template) ParseGlob(pattern stringConstant) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseGlob(t, string(pattern))
-}
-
-// ParseGlobFromTrustedSource parses the template definitions in the files identified by the
-// pattern and associates the resulting templates with t. The pattern is
-// processed by filepath.Glob and must match at least one file. ParseGlob is
-// equivalent to calling t.ParseFiles with the list of files matched by the
-// pattern.
-//
-// When parsing multiple files with the same name in different directories,
-// the last one mentioned will be the one that results.
-//
-// ParseGlobFromTrustedSource returns an error if t or any associated template has already been executed.
-//
-// To guarantee that the pattern, and thus the template bodies, is never controlled by
-// an attacker, pattern must be a trusted source, which is always under programmer or
-// application control.
-func (t *Template) ParseGlobFromTrustedSource(pattern TrustedSource) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseGlob(t, pattern.String())
-}
-
-// parseGlob is the implementation of the function and method ParseGlob.
-func parseGlob(t *Template, pattern string) (*Template, error) {
-	if err := t.checkCanParse(); err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	filenames, err := filepath.Glob(pattern)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
-	}
-	if len(filenames) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("html/template: pattern matches no files: %#q", pattern)
-	}
-	return parseFiles(t, readFileOS, filenames...)
-}
-
-// IsTrue reports whether the value is 'true', in the sense of not the zero of its type,
-// and whether the value has a meaningful truth value. This is the definition of
-// truth used by if and other such actions.
-func IsTrue(val interface{}) (truth, ok bool) {
-	return template.IsTrue(val)
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/transition.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/transition.go
deleted file mode 100644
index e0882e489..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/transition.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"bytes"
-	"strings"
-)
-
-// transitionFunc is the array of context transition functions for text nodes.
-// A transition function takes a context and template text input, and returns
-// the updated context and the number of bytes consumed from the front of the
-// input.
-var transitionFunc = [...]func(context, []byte) (context, int){
-	stateText:               tText,
-	stateSpecialElementBody: tSpecialTagEnd,
-	stateTag:                tTag,
-	stateAttrName:           tAttrName,
-	stateAfterName:          tAfterName,
-	stateBeforeValue:        tBeforeValue,
-	stateHTMLCmt:            tHTMLCmt,
-	stateAttr:               tAttr,
-	stateError:              tError,
-}
-
-var commentStart = []byte("<!--")
-var commentEnd = []byte("-->")
-
-// tText is the context transition function for the text state.
-func tText(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	k := 0
-	for {
-		i := k + bytes.IndexByte(s[k:], '<')
-		if i < k || i+1 == len(s) {
-			return c, len(s)
-		} else if i+4 <= len(s) && bytes.Equal(commentStart, s[i:i+4]) {
-			return context{state: stateHTMLCmt}, i + 4
-		}
-		i++
-		end := false
-		if s[i] == '/' {
-			if i+1 == len(s) {
-				return c, len(s)
-			}
-			end, i = true, i+1
-		}
-		j, e := eatTagName(s, i)
-		if j != i {
-			// We've found an HTML tag.
-			ret := context{state: stateTag}
-			// Element name not needed if we are at the end of the element.
-			if !end {
-				ret.element = e
-			}
-			return ret, j
-		}
-		k = j
-	}
-}
-
-// specialElements contains the names of elements whose bodies are treated
-// differently by the parser and escaper from stateText.
-var specialElements = map[string]bool{
-	"script":   true,
-	"style":    true,
-	"textarea": true,
-	"title":    true,
-}
-
-// voidElements contains the names of all void elements.
-// https://www.w3.org/TR/html5/syntax.html#void-elements
-var voidElements = map[string]bool{
-	"area":   true,
-	"base":   true,
-	"br":     true,
-	"col":    true,
-	"embed":  true,
-	"hr":     true,
-	"img":    true,
-	"input":  true,
-	"keygen": true,
-	"link":   true,
-	"meta":   true,
-	"param":  true,
-	"source": true,
-	"track":  true,
-	"wbr":    true,
-}
-
-// tTag is the context transition function for the tag state.
-func tTag(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	// Find the attribute name.
-	i := eatWhiteSpace(s, 0)
-	if i == len(s) {
-		return c, len(s)
-	}
-	if s[i] == '>' {
-		ret := context{
-			state:      stateText,
-			element:    c.element,
-			scriptType: c.scriptType,
-			linkRel:    c.linkRel,
-		}
-		if specialElements[c.element.name] {
-			ret.state = stateSpecialElementBody
-		}
-		if c.element.name != "" && voidElements[c.element.name] {
-			// Special case: end of start tag of a void element.
-			// Discard unnecessary state, since this element have no content.
-			ret.element = element{}
-			ret.scriptType = ""
-			ret.linkRel = ""
-		}
-		return ret, i + 1
-	}
-	j, err := eatAttrName(s, i)
-	if err != nil {
-		return context{state: stateError, err: err}, len(s)
-	}
-	state := stateTag
-	if i == j {
-		return context{
-			state: stateError,
-			err:   errorf(ErrBadHTML, nil, 0, "expected space, attr name, or end of tag, but got %q", s[i:]),
-		}, len(s)
-	}
-
-	if j == len(s) {
-		state = stateAttrName
-	} else {
-		state = stateAfterName
-	}
-	return context{
-		state:   state,
-		element: c.element,
-		attr:    attr{name: strings.ToLower(string(s[i:j]))},
-		linkRel: c.linkRel,
-	}, j
-}
-
-// tAttrName is the context transition function for stateAttrName.
-func tAttrName(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	i, err := eatAttrName(s, 0)
-	if err != nil {
-		return context{state: stateError, err: err}, len(s)
-	} else if i != len(s) {
-		c.state = stateAfterName
-	}
-	return c, i
-}
-
-// tAfterName is the context transition function for stateAfterName.
-func tAfterName(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	// Look for the start of the value.
-	i := eatWhiteSpace(s, 0)
-	if i == len(s) {
-		return c, len(s)
-	} else if s[i] != '=' {
-		// Occurs due to tag ending '>', and valueless attribute.
-		c.state = stateTag
-		return c, i
-	}
-	c.state = stateBeforeValue
-	// Consume the "=".
-	return c, i + 1
-}
-
-// tBeforeValue is the context transition function for stateBeforeValue.
-func tBeforeValue(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	i := eatWhiteSpace(s, 0)
-	if i == len(s) {
-		return c, len(s)
-	}
-	// Find the attribute delimiter.
-	// TODO: consider disallowing single-quoted or unquoted attribute values completely, even in hardcoded template text.
-	delim := delimSpaceOrTagEnd
-	switch s[i] {
-	case '\'':
-		delim, i = delimSingleQuote, i+1
-	case '"':
-		delim, i = delimDoubleQuote, i+1
-	}
-	c.state, c.delim = stateAttr, delim
-	return c, i
-}
-
-// tHTMLCmt is the context transition function for stateHTMLCmt.
-func tHTMLCmt(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	if i := bytes.Index(s, commentEnd); i != -1 {
-		return context{}, i + 3
-	}
-	return c, len(s)
-}
-
-var (
-	specialTagEndPrefix = []byte("</")
-	tagEndSeparators    = []byte("> \t\n\f/")
-)
-
-// tSpecialTagEnd is the context transition function for raw text, RCDATA
-// script data, and stylesheet element states.
-func tSpecialTagEnd(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	if specialElements[c.element.name] {
-		if i := indexTagEnd(s, []byte(c.element.name)); i != -1 {
-			return context{}, i
-		}
-	}
-	return c, len(s)
-}
-
-// indexTagEnd finds the index of a special tag end in a case insensitive way, or returns -1
-func indexTagEnd(s []byte, tag []byte) int {
-	res := 0
-	plen := len(specialTagEndPrefix)
-	for len(s) > 0 {
-		// Try to find the tag end prefix first
-		i := bytes.Index(s, specialTagEndPrefix)
-		if i == -1 {
-			return i
-		}
-		s = s[i+plen:]
-		// Try to match the actual tag if there is still space for it
-		if len(tag) <= len(s) && bytes.EqualFold(tag, s[:len(tag)]) {
-			s = s[len(tag):]
-			// Check the tag is followed by a proper separator
-			if len(s) > 0 && bytes.IndexByte(tagEndSeparators, s[0]) != -1 {
-				return res + i
-			}
-			res += len(tag)
-		}
-		res += i + plen
-	}
-	return -1
-}
-
-// tAttr is the context transition function for the attribute state.
-func tAttr(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	return c, len(s)
-}
-
-// tError is the context transition function for the error state.
-func tError(c context, s []byte) (context, int) {
-	return c, len(s)
-}
-
-// eatAttrName returns the largest j such that s[i:j] is an attribute name.
-// It returns an error if s[i:] does not look like it begins with an
-// attribute name, such as encountering a quote mark without a preceding
-// equals sign.
-func eatAttrName(s []byte, i int) (int, *Error) {
-	for j := i; j < len(s); j++ {
-		switch s[j] {
-		case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\f', '\r', '=', '>':
-			return j, nil
-		case '\'', '"', '<':
-			// These result in a parse warning in HTML5 and are
-			// indicative of serious problems if seen in an attr
-			// name in a template.
-			return -1, errorf(ErrBadHTML, nil, 0, "%q in attribute name: %.32q", s[j:j+1], s)
-		default:
-			// No-op.
-		}
-	}
-	return len(s), nil
-}
-
-// asciiAlpha reports whether c is an ASCII letter.
-func asciiAlpha(c byte) bool {
-	return 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' || 'a' <= c && c <= 'z'
-}
-
-// asciiAlphaNum reports whether c is an ASCII letter or digit.
-func asciiAlphaNum(c byte) bool {
-	return asciiAlpha(c) || '0' <= c && c <= '9'
-}
-
-// eatTagName returns the largest j such that s[i:j] is a tag name and the tag name.
-func eatTagName(s []byte, i int) (int, element) {
-	if i == len(s) || !asciiAlpha(s[i]) {
-		return i, element{}
-	}
-	j := i + 1
-	for j < len(s) {
-		x := s[j]
-		if asciiAlphaNum(x) {
-			j++
-			continue
-		}
-		// Allow "x-y" or "x:y" but not "x-", "-y", or "x--y".
-		if (x == ':' || x == '-') && j+1 < len(s) && asciiAlphaNum(s[j+1]) {
-			j += 2
-			continue
-		}
-		break
-	}
-	return j, element{name: strings.ToLower(string(s[i:j]))}
-}
-
-// eatWhiteSpace returns the largest j such that s[i:j] is white space.
-func eatWhiteSpace(s []byte, i int) int {
-	for j := i; j < len(s); j++ {
-		switch s[j] {
-		case ' ', '\t', '\n', '\f', '\r':
-			// No-op.
-		default:
-			return j
-		}
-	}
-	return len(s)
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedfs.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedfs.go
deleted file mode 100644
index 80db11824..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedfs.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-//go:build go1.16
-// +build go1.16
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"embed"
-	"fmt"
-	"io/fs"
-	"os"
-	"path"
-)
-
-// A TrustedFS is an immutable type referencing a filesystem (fs.FS)
-// under application control.
-//
-// In order to ensure that an attacker cannot influence the TrustedFS value, a
-// TrustedFS can be instantiated in only two ways. One way is from an embed.FS
-// with TrustedFSFromEmbed. It is assumed that embedded filesystems are under
-// the programmer's control. The other way is from a TrustedSource using
-// TrustedFSFromTrustedSource, in which case the guarantees and caveats of
-// TrustedSource apply.
-type TrustedFS struct {
-	fsys fs.FS
-}
-
-// TrustedFSFromEmbed constructs a TrustedFS from an embed.FS.
-func TrustedFSFromEmbed(fsys embed.FS) TrustedFS {
-	return TrustedFS{fsys: fsys}
-}
-
-// TrustedFSFromTrustedSource constructs a TrustedFS from the string in the
-// TrustedSource, which should refer to a directory.
-func TrustedFSFromTrustedSource(ts TrustedSource) TrustedFS {
-	return TrustedFS{fsys: os.DirFS(ts.src)}
-}
-
-// Sub returns a TrustedFS at a subdirectory of the receiver.
-// It works by calling fs.Sub on the receiver's fs.FS.
-func (tf TrustedFS) Sub(dir TrustedSource) (TrustedFS, error) {
-	subfs, err := fs.Sub(tf.fsys, dir.String())
-	return TrustedFS{fsys: subfs}, err
-}
-
-// ParseFS is like ParseFiles or ParseGlob but reads from the TrustedFS
-// instead of the host operating system's file system.
-// It accepts a list of glob patterns.
-// (Note that most file names serve as glob patterns matching only themselves.)
-//
-// The same behaviors listed for ParseFiles() apply to ParseFS too (e.g. using the base name
-// of the file as the template name).
-func ParseFS(tfs TrustedFS, patterns ...string) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFS(nil, tfs.fsys, patterns)
-}
-
-// ParseFS is like ParseFiles or ParseGlob but reads from the TrustedFS
-// instead of the host operating system's file system.
-// It accepts a list of glob patterns.
-// (Note that most file names serve as glob patterns matching only themselves.)
-//
-// The same behaviors listed for ParseFiles() apply to ParseFS too (e.g. using the base name
-// of the file as the template name).
-func (t *Template) ParseFS(tfs TrustedFS, patterns ...string) (*Template, error) {
-	return parseFS(t, tfs.fsys, patterns)
-}
-
-// Copied from
-// https://go.googlesource.com/go/+/refs/tags/go1.17.1/src/text/template/helper.go.
-func parseFS(t *Template, fsys fs.FS, patterns []string) (*Template, error) {
-	var filenames []string
-	for _, pattern := range patterns {
-		list, err := fs.Glob(fsys, pattern)
-		if err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-		if len(list) == 0 {
-			return nil, fmt.Errorf("template: pattern matches no files: %#q", pattern)
-		}
-		filenames = append(filenames, list...)
-	}
-	return parseFiles(t, readFileFS(fsys), filenames...)
-}
-
-// Copied with minor changes from
-// https://go.googlesource.com/go/+/refs/tags/go1.17.1/src/text/template/helper.go.
-func readFileFS(fsys fs.FS) func(string) (string, []byte, error) {
-	return func(file string) (string, []byte, error) {
-		name := path.Base(file)
-		b, err := fs.ReadFile(fsys, file)
-		return name, b, err
-	}
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedsource.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedsource.go
deleted file mode 100644
index f64263948..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedsource.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"os"
-	"path/filepath"
-	"strings"
-
-	"flag"
-)
-
-// A TrustedSource is an immutable string-like type referencing
-// trusted template files under application control. It can be passed to
-// template-parsing functions and methods to safely load templates
-// without the risk of untrusted template execution.
-//
-// In order to ensure that an attacker cannot influence the TrustedSource
-// value, a TrustedSource can be instantiated only from untyped string
-// constants, command-line flags, and other application-controlled strings, but
-// never from arbitrary string values potentially representing untrusted user input.
-//
-// Note that TrustedSource's constructors cannot truly guarantee that the
-// templates it references are not attacker-controlled; it can guarantee only that
-// the path to the template itself is under application control. Users of these
-// constructors must ensure themselves that TrustedSource never references
-// attacker-controlled files or directories that contain such files.
-type TrustedSource struct {
-	// We declare a TrustedSource not as a string but as a struct wrapping a string
-	// to prevent construction of TrustedSource values through string conversion.
-	src string
-}
-
-// TrustedSourceFromConstant constructs a TrustedSource with its underlying
-// src set to the given src, which must be an untyped string constant.
-//
-// No runtime validation or sanitization is performed on src; being under
-// application control, it is simply assumed to comply with the TrustedSource type
-// contract.
-func TrustedSourceFromConstant(src stringConstant) TrustedSource {
-	return TrustedSource{string(src)}
-}
-
-// TrustedSourceFromConstantDir constructs a TrustedSource calling path/filepath.Join on
-// an application-controlled directory path, which must be an untyped string constant,
-// a TrustedSource, and a dynamic filename. It returns an error if filename contains
-// filepath or list separators, since this might cause the resulting path to reference a
-// file outside of the given directory.
-//
-// dir or src may be empty if either of these path segments are not required.
-func TrustedSourceFromConstantDir(dir stringConstant, src TrustedSource, filename string) (TrustedSource, error) {
-	if i := strings.IndexAny(filename, string([]rune{filepath.Separator, filepath.ListSeparator})); i != -1 {
-		return TrustedSource{}, fmt.Errorf("filename %q must not contain the separator %q", filename, filename[i])
-	}
-	if filename == ".." {
-		return TrustedSource{}, fmt.Errorf("filename must not be the special name %q", filename)
-	}
-	return TrustedSource{filepath.Join(string(dir), src.String(), filename)}, nil
-}
-
-// TrustedSourceJoin is a wrapper around path/filepath.Join that returns a
-// TrustedSource formed by joining the given path elements into a single path,
-// adding an OS-specific path separator if necessary.
-func TrustedSourceJoin(elem ...TrustedSource) TrustedSource {
-	return TrustedSource{filepath.Join(trustedSourcesToStrings(elem)...)}
-}
-
-// TrustedSourceFromFlag returns a TrustedSource containing the string
-// representation of the retrieved value of the flag.
-//
-// In a server setting, flags are part of the application's deployment
-// configuration and are hence considered application-controlled.
-func TrustedSourceFromFlag(value flag.Value) TrustedSource {
-	return TrustedSource{fmt.Sprint(value.String())}
-}
-
-// TrustedSourceFromEnvVar is a wrapper around os.Getenv that
-// returns a TrustedSource containing the value of the environment variable
-// named by the key. It returns the value, which will be empty if the variable
-// is not present. To distinguish between an empty value and an unset value,
-// use os.LookupEnv.
-//
-// In a server setting, environment variables are part of the application's
-// deployment configuration and are hence considered application-controlled.
-func TrustedSourceFromEnvVar(key stringConstant) TrustedSource {
-	return TrustedSource{os.Getenv(string(key))}
-}
-
-// String returns the string form of the TrustedSource.
-func (t TrustedSource) String() string {
-	return t.src
-}
-
-func trustedSourcesToStrings(paths []TrustedSource) []string {
-	ret := make([]string, 0, len(paths))
-	for _, p := range paths {
-		ret = append(ret, p.String())
-	}
-	return ret
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedtemplate.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedtemplate.go
deleted file mode 100644
index bd3b1b46a..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/trustedtemplate.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-//
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file or at
-// https://developers.google.com/open-source/licenses/bsd
-
-package template
-
-// A TrustedTemplate is an immutable string-like type containing a
-// safehtml/template template body. It can be safely loaded as template
-// text without the risk of untrusted template execution.
-//
-// In order to ensure that an attacker cannot influence the TrustedTemplate
-// value, a TrustedTemplate can be instantiated only from untyped string constants,
-// and never from arbitrary string values potentially representing untrusted user input.
-//
-type TrustedTemplate struct {
-	// We declare a TrustedTemplate not as a string but as a struct wrapping a string
-	// to prevent construction of TrustedTemplate values through string conversion.
-	tmpl string
-}
-
-// MakeTrustedTemplate constructs a TrustedTemplate with its underlying
-// tmpl set to the given tmpl, which must be an untyped string constant.
-//
-// No runtime validation or sanitization is performed on tmpl; being under
-// application control, it is simply assumed to comply with the TrustedTemplate type
-// contract.
-func MakeTrustedTemplate(tmpl stringConstant) TrustedTemplate {
-	return TrustedTemplate{string(tmpl)}
-}
-
-// String returns the string form of the TrustedTemplate.
-func (t TrustedTemplate) String() string {
-	return t.tmpl
-}
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/url.go b/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/url.go
deleted file mode 100644
index f63475fcf..000000000
--- a/vendor/github.com/google/safehtml/template/url.go
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
-// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
-// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-
-package template
-
-import (
-	"fmt"
-	"html"
-	"regexp"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/google/safehtml/internal/safehtmlutil"
-	"github.com/google/safehtml"
-)
-
-// urlPrefixValidators maps URL and TrustedResourceURL sanitization contexts to functions return an error
-// if the given string is unsafe to use as a URL prefix in that sanitization context.
-var urlPrefixValidators = map[sanitizationContext]func(string) error{
-	sanitizationContextURL:                     validateURLPrefix,
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURLOrURL: validateURLPrefix,
-	sanitizationContextTrustedResourceURL:      validateTrustedResourceURLPrefix,
-}
-
-// startsWithFullySpecifiedSchemePattern matches strings that have a fully-specified scheme component.
-// See RFC 3986 Section 3.
-var startsWithFullySpecifiedSchemePattern = regexp.MustCompile(
-	`^[[:alpha:]](?:[[:alnum:]]|[+.-])*:`)
-
-// validateURLPrefix validates if the given non-empty prefix is a safe safehtml.URL prefix.
-//
-// Prefixes are considered unsafe if they end in an incomplete HTML character reference
-// or percent-encoding character triplet.
-//
-// If the prefix contains a fully-specified scheme component, it is considered safe only if
-// it starts with an allowed scheme. See safehtml.URLSanitized for more details.
-//
-// Otherwise, the prefix is safe only if it contains '/', '?', or '#', since the presence of any
-// of these runes ensures that this prefix, when combined with some arbitrary suffix, cannot be
-// interpreted as a part of a scheme.
-func validateURLPrefix(prefix string) error {
-	decoded, err := decodeURLPrefix(prefix)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	switch {
-	case startsWithFullySpecifiedSchemePattern.MatchString(decoded):
-		if safehtml.URLSanitized(decoded).String() != decoded {
-			return fmt.Errorf("URL prefix %q contains an unsafe scheme", prefix)
-		}
-	case !strings.ContainsAny(decoded, "/?#"):
-		// If the URL prefix does not already have a ':' scheme delimiter, and does not contain
-		// '/', '?', or '#', any ':' following this prefix will be intepreted as a scheme
-		// delimiter, causing this URL prefix to be interpreted as being part of a scheme.
-		// e.g. `<a href="java{{ "script:" }}alert(1)>`
-		return fmt.Errorf("URL prefix %q is unsafe; it might be interpreted as part of a scheme", prefix)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// validateTrustedResourceURLPrefix validates if the given non-empty prefix is a safe
-// safehtml.TrustedResourceURL prefix.
-//
-// Prefixes are considered unsafe if they end in an incomplete HTML character reference
-// or percent-encoding character triplet.
-//
-// See safehtmlutil.IsSafeTrustedResourceURLPrefix for details on how the prefix is validated.
-func validateTrustedResourceURLPrefix(prefix string) error {
-	decoded, err := decodeURLPrefix(prefix)
-	if err != nil {
-		return err
-	}
-	if !safehtmlutil.IsSafeTrustedResourceURLPrefix(decoded) {
-		return fmt.Errorf("%q is a disallowed TrustedResourceURL prefix", prefix)
-	}
-	return nil
-}
-
-// endsWithPercentEncodingPrefixPattern matches strings that end in an incomplete
-// URL percent encoding triplet.
-//
-// See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-2.1.
-var endsWithPercentEncodingPrefixPattern = regexp.MustCompile(
-	`%[[:xdigit:]]?$`)
-
-// containsWhitespaceOrControlPattern matches strings that contain ASCII whitespace
-// or control characters.
-var containsWhitespaceOrControlPattern = regexp.MustCompile(`[[:space:]]|[[:cntrl:]]`)
-
-// decodeURLPrefix returns the given prefix after it has been HTML-unescaped.
-// It returns an error if the prefix:
-//    * ends in an incomplete HTML character reference before HTML-unescaping,
-//    * ends in an incomplete percent-encoding character triplet after HTML-unescaping, or
-//    * contains whitespace before or after HTML-unescaping.
-func decodeURLPrefix(prefix string) (string, error) {
-	if containsWhitespaceOrControlPattern.MatchString(prefix) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("URL prefix %q contains whitespace or control characters", prefix)
-	}
-	if err := validateDoesNotEndsWithCharRefPrefix(prefix); err != nil {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("URL %s", err)
-	}
-	decoded := html.UnescapeString(prefix)
-	// Check again for whitespace that might have previously been masked by a HTML reference,
-	// such as in "javascript&NewLine;".
-	if containsWhitespaceOrControlPattern.MatchString(decoded) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("URL prefix %q contains whitespace or control characters", prefix)
-	}
-	if endsWithPercentEncodingPrefixPattern.MatchString(decoded) {
-		return "", fmt.Errorf("URL prefix %q ends with an incomplete percent-encoding character triplet", prefix)
-	}
-	return decoded, nil
-}
-
-func validateTrustedResourceURLSubstitution(args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
-	input := safehtmlutil.Stringify(args...)
-	if safehtmlutil.URLContainsDoubleDotSegment(input) {
-		// Reject substitutions containing the ".." dot-segment to prevent the final TrustedResourceURL from referencing
-		// a resource higher up in the path name hierarchy than the path specified in the prefix.
-		return "", fmt.Errorf(`cannot substitute %q after TrustedResourceURL prefix: ".." is disallowed`, input)
-	}
-	return input, nil
-}